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I. INTRODUCTION 
This appeal arises, in part, from Taylor's motion for reconsideration that included the 
submission of additional declarations from Taylor, his expert Professor McDermott and the 
undersigned counsel, which were all timely served within two weeks of when the district court 
entered the two "Final Amended Judgments", certified as final in accordance with I.R.C.P. 54(b), 
in favor of Riley and HTEH on October 9, 2015. 1 (R. 6322-79 (A. 123-56)2.) 
At oral argument, Justice Eismann raised for the very first time on appeal the issue 
regarding whether Taylor's motion for reconsideration was timely given that there had been a prior 
partial consent judgment dismissing Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow from the lawsuit on 
September 18, 2015 and Taylor's motion to reconsider was not served within two weeks of that 
judgment. (Id.; R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32)3.) Taylor maintained at oral argument the partial consent 
judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was not a final judgment 
and could not retroactively make the prior partial judgments entered in favor of Riley and HTEH 
final ones. Justice Eismann4 suggested otherwise, which led to this Supplemental Appellant's 
Brief. 
For the reasons discussed below and with the utmost of due respect to Justice Eismann, 
Taylor maintains his position at oral argument was correct based on the facts and circumstances 
1 For convenience of the Court and the parties, Taylor will use the same abbreviations for 
the parties that he used in prior briefing. (Appellant's Br. at 1.) 
2 Taylor's citation to "A." in this Supplemental Brief is to the Appendix attached to his 
original Appellant's Brief. 
3 Taylor's citation to "SA." in this Supplemental Brief is to the Appendix attached to this 
Supplemental Brief. 
4 The undersigned found Justice Eismann's memorandum on judgments most helpful. 
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of this case and the clear and unambiguous language ofl.R.C.P. 54. The partial consent judgment 
entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow (SA. 30-32) was merely one of five 
partial non-final judgments entered in this multi-party and multi-claim lawsuit and "any order or 
other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights 
and liabilities of less than all the parties shall not terminate the actions as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry 
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." I.R.C.P. 
54(b) (2015). 5 Thus, the Eberle Berlin and Estate of Turnbow judgment was simply a partial 
judgment. 
Simply put, the three non-final partial judgments entered separately in favor of Riley (SA. 
19-20), Hawley Troxell (SA. 21-22) and Eberle Berlin and Turnbow (SA. 30-32) do not 
independently or collectively comply with I.R.C.P. 54 and they do not, and cannot, independently 
or collectively constitute one final ''judgment" as required by I.R.C.P. 54. Moreover, the record 
(including the augmented portion) conclusively establishes that, inter alia, it was not the district 
court's intent, nor the parties' intent, that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle 
Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow be a final and appealable judgment and Taylor's motion for 
5 As this Court is well aware, I.R.C.P. 54(b) was later amended in 2016 to replace the words 
"order or other form of decision" with the word "judgment". The then-existing 2015 applicable 
rules are reproduced in the attached Appendix, which Taylor obtained from an archived website 
for this Court, https://web.archive.org/web/20150810102419/http://www.isc.idaho.gov:80/ircp 
(last visited on August 20, 2017). The rules existing in 2015 apply here, and portions of the then-
existing applicable Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Appellate Rules were copied 
verbatim from those archived web pages into a new Word document, which is attached, and 
portions highlighted, in the Supplemental Appendix attached to this Brief. (SA. 1-11.) 
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reconsideration, and the three declarations submitted with that motion, were thus timely filed and 
served. There are procedural reasons why Taylor's motion for reconsideration was timely, too. 
However, even if Justice Eismann's concerns are correct (there is much confusion as to 
what constitutes a final judgment under the authorities and Idaho law), Taylor actually timely filed 
his notice of appeal within 42 days of the entry of the partial consent judgment entered in favor 
Eberle Berlin and Estate of Turnbow, and Taylor previously raised the same issues asserted on 
appeal in other prior motions. Thus, this Court still has more than a sufficient record to reverse the 
district court on all issues presented on appeal. This Court should still reverse, vacate the 
. judgments and fee awards entered, remand this case for trial, and reserve an award of fees to 
Taylor. 
In addition, this Court should take this opportunity to eliminate all confusion once and for 
all through the creation of a bright-line rule that the final judgment in any lawsuit should include 
all parties to an action (even if they were dismissed earlier through partial judgments). 
II. SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL IDSTORY 
On October 1, 2009, Taylor filed his complaint asserting numerous claims against 
numerous parties-Riley, HTEH, Eberle Berlin and Turnbow-thereby implicating I.R.C.P. 
54(b)'s requirements regarding partial final judgments or one final judgment. (R. 25-50.) 
On June 3, 2010, the district court entered its first partial judgment dismissing Taylor's 
complaint against HTEH. (R. 1736-37 (SA. 12-13).) On August 27, 2014, this Court reversed the 
district court as to the negligence claim against Riley based on the transaction being the same for 
purpose ofresjudicata. Taylor v. Riley, 157 Idaho 323,336 P.3d 256 (2014) ("Riley I"). 
3 
On February 20, 2015, the district court denied Riley and HTEH's motion to certify their 
respective judgments as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b). (R. 5037-39 (SA. 14-16).) Instead, on February 
20, 2015, the district court entered the first partial judgment in favor of Riley. (R. 5040-41 (SA. 
17-18).) The HTEH judgment remained unchanged. (R. 1736-37 (SA. 12-13).) 
On July 8, 2015 (after fees and costs were awarded, R. 5816-25), the district court entered 
the two second partial judgments in favor of Riley ($239,265.25) and Hawley Troxell 
($25,029.00), respectively. (R. 5830-33 (SA. 19-22).) 
On August 27, 2015, Taylor mediated with Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow. (R. 
6299.) That mediation was successful. 6 On September 11, 2015, Taylor, Eberle Berlin and the 
Estate of Turnbow entered into a Stipulation to dismiss Taylor's claims against them with 
prejudice and without an award of fees or costs to either party. (R. 6305-09 (SA. 23-27).) Riley 
and HTEH were not parties to that Stipulation or the settlement. (Id.) On September 11, 2015, the 
district court entered the order dismissing Taylor's claims against Eberle Berlin and the Estate of 
Turnbow with prejudice. (R. 6310-11 (SA. 28-29).) 
On September 18, 2015 at 11:32 AM, the district court's clerk emailed all counsel to this 
lawsuit (including counsel for Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow) advising them that final 
judgments were needed: 
Judge Greenwood did sign the proposed order and judgment [for Eberle Berlin and 
the Estate of Turnbow] to this case. But he has a note that you need to submit an 
amended judgment and Rule 54(b) certificate for Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell. 
6 Riley and HTEH refused to attend the mediation, despite requests from Taylor's counsel. 
4 
Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns. 
(Aug. p. 7 (SA. 52).) Later, at 3:06 PM on that same day (after the district court's clarifying email), 
the district court entered the partial consent judgment in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of 
Turnbow, which was the product of the Stipulation only between Taylor and them. (R. 6305-09 
(SA. 23-27), 6313-15 (SA. 30-32).) That partial judgment was nearly identical in form to two other 
partial judgments previously filed in favor of Riley and Hawley Troxell. (R. 1736-37 9SA 12-13), 
5037-39 (SA 17-18).) None of these three partial judgments standing alone, or collectively, 
complied with the clear language ofl.R.C.P. 54(a) and (b). (Id.; R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32).) 
On September 19, 2017, Taylor's counsel emailed the district court's clerk stating: "I will 
reach out to Keely and Loren to see if we can all agree on the form of the final judgment as to all 
parties and then get something to the judge." (Aug. p. 8 (SA. 53).) Shortly thereafter, Taylor's 
counsel then emailed Loren Ipsen, Keely Duke and Kevin Griffiths (opposing counsel) stating: 
I propose that we send a joint final judgment for the judge's signature. I think that 
the judgment would simply combine what is [in] the judgment that was recently 
submitted by Keely with the contents of the judgment[ s] previously entered for 
HTEH and Mr. Riley. It seems to me that would be the form necessary. What do 
you both think?" 
(Aug. p. 9 (SA. 54).) 
On September 21, 2015, Riley and HTEH' s counsel, Loren Ipsen, emailed Taylor's counsel 
back (and carbon copied other counsel) stating: 
Thanks for your offer, but it appears from Kathy Pataro's email that the Court has 
already signed the proposed order and judgment, which I assume relate to the 
Turnbow estate and Eberle Berlin. Therefore, I think it would be simpler for us just 
to submit final judgments for Hawley Troxell and Mr. Riley as suggested by the 
Court. 
5 
(Aug. p. 10 (SA. 55).) Later that same day (September 21, 2015), Riley and HTEH's counsel had 
his assistant email the district court's clerk with two proposed "Amended Final Judgment[s]", with 
each of them containing an I.R.C.P. 54(b) certificate. (Aug. p. 11-17 (SA. 56-62).) On the next day 
(September 22, 2015), Taylor's counsel emailed the district court's clerk advising her that the 
proposed "Amended Final Judgment[ s ]" were not approved by him and that "the parties did not 
work together to approve the judgments." (Aug. p. 18 (SA. 63).) Taylor's counsel did not object 
to those judgments because he believed that the district court could either certify partial judgments 
as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b) or enter one consolidated judgment for all of the parties and all of the 
claims, i.e., a final judgment that included Riley, HTEH, Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow. 
(Aug. p. 2-3, 9 (SA. 47-48, 54).) 
On October 9, 2015, the district court entered the two "Final Amended Judgment[s]" with 
I.R.C.P. 54(b) certificates, in the identical form prepared and submitted by Riley and HTEH's 
counsel. (R. 6316-19 (SA. 33-38); Aug. p. 11-17 (SA. 56-62).) 
On October 23, 2015, Taylor timely filed and served his motion for reconsideration and 
submitted the Declarations of Professor Richard McDermott, Reed Taylor and Roderick Bond in 
support of that motion. (R. 6322-79 (A. 123-56) (the Appendix attached to the Appellant's Brief 
contained the declarations only).) 
On October 29, 2015, Taylor timely filed his notice of appeal, which was later amended 
two more times. (R. 6406-31, 6542-6571, 6735-59 .) If this Court agrees with Justice Eismann, 
then Taylor's notice of appeal was still timely filed within 42 days of the partial judgment entered 
6 
in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow. (Id.; R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32).) 
On March 3, 2016 (after denying reconsideration and awarding more fees, R. 6485-86, 
6726-27), the district court entered two Second Amended Judgments for Riley ($243,015.25) and 
HTEH ($28,779.00), respectively. (R. 6724-25 (SA 41-42), 6728-29 (SA 39-40.) 
From the time before the partial consent judgment was entered in favor of Eberle Berlin 
and the Estate of Turnbow (because they settled with Taylor) through and up until the time of oral 
argument for this appeal on August 17, 2017, the district court and all counsel all proceeded in a 
manner consistent with the understanding that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of 
Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was not a final and appealable judgment. (Aug. p. 1-18 
(SA. 51-68); Resp'ts' Br. at 1-59.) 
On August 17, 2017, oral argument was held on this appeal and, after Taylor's oral request, 
this Court graciously agreed to allow Taylor to file a Supplemental Brief.7 (8/17/17 Order.) On 
August 21, 2017, Taylor filed a Motion to Augment the Record (cited herein as "Aug. p.") to 
address the issues raised by Justice Eismann. (SA. 46-63.) This Supplemental Brief followed. 
III. SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether this Court can raise, sua sponte for the first time on appeal, the issue of 
subjection matter jurisdiction pertaining to the timeliness of Taylor's motion for reconsideration. 
2. Whether, in this multi-party and multi-claim lawsuit, the partial consent judgment 
entered in favor of two of the four defendants, Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow (after those 
parties settled with Taylor), was a non-final partial judgment or a final and appealable judgment. 
7 The undersigned counsel greatly appreciates this Court's willingness to allow him to file 
this Supplemental Appellant's Brief and he apologizes for the length of this Brief. 
7 
3. Whether the district court, and the parties, intended that the partial consent 
judgment entered in favor Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was a final and appealable 
judgment. 
4. Whether Riley and HTEH may object or assign error to the entry of the Final 
Amended Judgments when they were the ones who invited any errors when they prepared and 
submitted the Final Amended Judgments to the district court and thus any error associated with 
the entry of those I.R.C.P. 54(b) judgments was harmless and/or invited error. 
5. Whether the jurisdictional issue regarding the timeliness of Taylor's motion for 
reconsideration is even implicated because Taylor was not, and could not, seek to amend or reverse 
the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow and Riley 
and HTEH never objected to any alleged untimeliness and invited any error. 
6. Assuming this Court holds that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of 
Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was a final judgment, whether Taylor's appeal was timely. 
7. Assuming this Court holds that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of 
Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was a final judgment, whether this Court can still reverse 
on all of the issues raised on appeal because Taylor previously raised all of the issues on appeal 
and those issues are all supported by evidence that was already in the record prior to the last motion 
for reconsideration. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standards of Review. 
"The same rules of interpretation apply [to a judgment] as in ascertaining the meaning of 
any other writing." Evans v. City of American Falls, 52 Idaho 7, 11 P.2d 363, 367 (1932) If this 
Court "finds [a] judgment ambiguous, it may refer to the circumstances surrounding the making 
of the judgment in attempting to interpret it." Lester v. Lester, 104 Idaho 244, 245, 658 P.2d 915, 
916 (1983); see also Evans, 11 P.2d at 367 ("In applying a judgment, 'if the language be in any 
degree uncertain, we may properly refer to the circumstances surrounding the making of the order 
or judgment, to the condition of the cause in which it was entered."). When determining issues 
around the sufficiency of the form of a final judgment or appealable order, this Court has 
8 
considered other Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellate Rules. Cf Spokane Structures, Inc. v. 
Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 619-21, 226 P.3d 1263, 1266-68 (2010); Camp v. East Fork 
Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 866-68, 55 P.3d 304, 320-22 (2002). 
This Court has, "in the past, applied rules of statutory construction in the interpretation of 
our rules of civil procedure. In matters of construction, this Court prefers an interpretation that 
gives meaning to every word, clause, and sentence." Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 
Idaho 892,900, 188 P.3d 834, 842 (2008). 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. Such 
intent should be derived from a reading of the whole act at issue. Statutory 
interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute, and this language should 
be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If the statutory language is 
unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given 
effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory 
construction. This is because [t]he asserted purpose for enacting the legislation 
cannot modify its plain meaning. 
Jayo Dev., Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 158 Idaho 148, 152, 345 P.3d 207,211 (2015) 
(citation omitted). However, there are two additional caveats when this Court interprets the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. First, 
'[t]he interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is a matter of law over 
which this Court exercises free review.' Harrison v. Bd. of Prof'! Discipline of 
Idaho State Bd. of Med., 145 Idaho 179, 181, 177 P.3d 393,395 (2008). The Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure 'shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.' I.R.C.P. 1 (a). 
Athay v. Rich County, 153 Idaho 815,823,291 P.3d 1014, 1022 (2012) (emphasis added). Second, 
"consistent with the mandate ofl.R.C.P. l(a), this Court will construe the provisions of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure liberally in order to resolve cases on their merits instead of on 
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technicalities." Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. North Pacific Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241,247, 178 P.3d 
606, 612 (2008) ( citation omitted) ( emphasis added). 
B. This Court May, Sua Sponte, Raise the Jurisdictional Issue Relating to the Timeliness 
of Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration. 
For the first time on appeal at the time of oral argument, Justice Eismann raised the 
jurisdictional issue of whether Taylor's last motion for reconsideration was untimely. Taylor 
concedes that Justice Eismann is correct that the issue can be raised by this Court anytime. 
"Although neither party challenge[d] [the district court's] decision regarding jurisdiction 
on appeal, this Court can consider the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte." Williams v. 
Blue Cross of Idaho, 151 Idaho 515, 518, 260 P.3d 1186, 1189 (2011) (citation omitted). 
Jurisdictional matters include whether a motion for reconsideration was timely. Cf Wicke/ v. 
Chamberlain, 159 Idaho 532, 536-37, 363 P.3d 854, 858-59 (2015). 
Thus, this Court may address sua sponte for the first time on appeal the jurisdictional issue 
relating to the timeliness of Taylor's motion for reconsideration, and the three declarations 
submitted in support of that motion. (R. 6316-21 (SA 33-38), 6322-79 (A. 123-56) (the Appendix 
attached to the Appellant's Brief only contains the three declarations).) However, in order to 
address the jurisdictional issue, this Court must first determine whether the partial consent 
judgment entered only in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow on September 18, 2015 
was a final judgment or whether the Amended Final Judgments entered in favor of Hawley Troxell 
and Riley on October 9, 2015 were the final judgments for purposes of this appeal and Taylor's 
motion for reconsideration (as the parties and district court believed). 
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Taylor maintains that the partial consent judgment entered for Eberle Berlin and the Estate 
of Turnbow (SA. 33-35) was simply one of many non-final partial judgments entered in this multi-
party and multi-claim lawsuit (SA. 12-13, 17-22, 30-32) and that the Final Amended Judgments, 
certified as final pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) (SA. 3) entered in favor of Riley and HTEH are the 
two final and appealable judgments for this appeal. (SA 33-38.) If this Court agrees with any of 
the arguments asserted by Taylor in Section C below (Taylor acknowledges that the issue has been 
addressed in many different fact patterns-all distinguishable from the facts here), then Taylor's 
motion for reconsideration and the three declarations submitted in support of that motion were 
timely filed and served. If this Court disagrees, then Taylor addresses those contingent issues in 
Section D below. Taylor will now first address each argument in tum. 
C. The Amended Final Judgments Entered in Favor of Riley and Hawley Troxell Are the 
Final Judgments for Purposes of this Appeal and Taylor's Motion for 
Reconsideration-Not the Interlocutory Partial Consent Judgment Entered in Favor 
of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow-and This Court Should Liberally 
Construe the Rules to Resolve the Issue in Taylor's Favor to Ensure a Just 
Determination of this Appeal and to Ensure that This Appeal Is Decided on the Merits 
Instead of on a Technicality. 
At oral argument, Justice Eismann suggested that the partial consent judgment entered in 
favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow on September 18, 2015 (SA. 30-32) was a final 
and appealable judgment and, therefore, Taylor's motion for reconsideration, and the three 
additional declarations submitted with that motion, are not properly before this Court because they 
were untimely filed and served on October 23, 2015 (although they were timely within 14 days of 
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the Final Amended Judgments entered in favor of Riley and HTEH on October 9, 2015). 8 (R. 6322-
79 (A. 123-56).) While Taylor appreciates the confusion that has arisen over the years regarding 
what constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal, Taylor maintains that his motion for 
reconsideration and the three declarations submitted with that motion were timely filed and served 
for the following reasons. 
1. Taylor Maintains that the Plain, Obvious, and Rational Interpretation of Every 
Applicable Word, Clause and Sentence in I.R.C.P. 54(b) Dictates One Conclusion 
Based on the Facts and Circumstances Here--that the Partial Consent Judgment 
Entered in Favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow Was Not a Final 
Judgment-Which Is Also the Result this Court's Mandate to Interpret the Rules 
Liberally and Justly in Favor of Taylor So that this Appeal Is Resolved on the Merits 
Rather than on a Technicality. 
While Taylor concedes that there are numerous conflicting authorities (all with fact 
patterns distinguishable to the facts present here),9 Taylor maintains that the only appealable 
judgments in this multi-party and multi-claim lawsuit, R. 25-50, were the two Final Amended 
Judgments, which were certified as final pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) and entered in favor of Riley 
and HTEH on October 9, 2015. (SA 33-38.) The plain, rational and obvious interpretation of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Appellate Rules, in the required manner required to do 
8 "[A] motion for reconsideration is made when it is served, not when it is filed." Fagen, 
Inc. v. Lava Beds Wind Park, LLC, 159 Idaho 628,633,364 P.3d 1193, 1098 (2016). 
9 See, e.g., Camp, 137 Idaho at 867-68, 55 P.3d at 321-22 (in an action between a single 
plaintiff and a single defendant, stating the general rule that "[ a ]s a general rule, a final judgment 
is an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, 
and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties."). In that case, the lawsuit only 
involved a single plaintiff and a single defendant and a final judgment was later entered after the 
district court granted the motion for involuntary dismissal (though the language contained in the 
final judgment is unclear). 137 Idaho at 855,868, 55 P.3d at 309,322. Here, this lawsuit involves 
multiple parties and multiple claims, and the district court properly entered two final and 
appealable (and executable) judgments in favor of Riley and HTEH. (R. 25-50; SA. 33-35.) 
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justice and to determine this appeal on the merits instead of on technicalities based on the facts 
and circumstances of this case, dictate that this is the correct result. 
Here, the clear and plain meaning ofl.R.C.P. 54 dictates that a partial judgment entered in 
favor of two of the four defendants in this lawsuit was not a final judgment. Significantly, this 
multi-party and multi-claim lawsuit implicates I.R.C.P. 54(b), which is controlling and supports 
Taylor's position that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and Turnbow 
was not a final and appealablejudgment. (R. 25-50, 6313-15 (SA. 30-32).) 
The pertinent portion ofl.R.C.P. 54(a) provides: 
A iudgment is final if either it has been certified as final pursuant to subsection 
(b)(l) of this rule or iudgment has been entered on all claims for relief. except 
costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action. 
I.R.C.P. 54(a) (2015) (emphasis added) (SA 2). The pertinent portion ofl.R.C.P. 54(b) provides: 
When more than one claim for reliefis presented in an action ... or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or 
more but less than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination 
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of 
the judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or 
other form of decision, however designated, which adiudicates less than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities ofless than all the parties shall not terminate 
the actions as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of 
decision is subiect to revision at any time before the entry of iudgment 
adiudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
I.R.C.P. 54(b) (2015) (emphasis added) (SA. 3). The pertinent portion ofl.R.C.P. 54(c) provides 
that "[ e ]xcept as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final iudgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled ... " I.R.C.P. 54(c) 
(2015) (emphasis added) (SA. 4). These principals are further explained in various treatises. 
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If the writing corresponds with the definition of a judgment and appears to have 
been intended by the court as a determination of the rights of the parties .. . A 
requirement that a trial court must denominate its final ruling as a judgment is not 
a mere formality; it must be clear from the writing that the document or entry is 
being called a judgment by the trial court for purposes of determining when a final 
appealable judgment is entered. 
46 AM. JUR. 2D JUDGMENTS § 64 (2017) ( emphasis added). 
Here, the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and Turnbow was not 
a final judgment because it "adjudicates less than all of the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
less than all the parties." I.R.C.P. 54(b). (SA. 30-32). That partial consent judgment 
unambiguously only dismissed Taylor's claims against Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow: 
Judgment is entered as to all claims against Defendants Sharon Cummings, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, 
Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, which are dismissed with prejudice. 
(R. 6314 (SA. 31).) That judgment was not certified as final pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b). (R. 6313-
15 (SA. 30-32).) In addition, technically speaking, while the Estate of Turnbow was eventually 
substituted in as a defendant (R. 1778-80), there still is no judgment that specifically addresses the 
claims assert against Turnbow individually in the complaint. (R. 25-50 (SA. 17-22, 30-42.) In any 
event, the district court correctly concluded that partial judgment did not comply with I.R.C.P. 
54(a), I.R.C.P. 54(b) or I.R.C.P. 54(c) because it only addressed the claims asserted against two of 
the parties, Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow. I.R.C.P. 54(a)-(c) (2015) (SA. 2-4, 30-32). 
The plain, rational, and obvious interpretation of the then-existing I.R.C.P. 54 using every word 
and sentence (as applied to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and liberally construed 
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to reach a just outcome on the merits and not on a technicality) 10 dictates that there be a single 
final judgment that includes the resolution of all parties and all claims in a single judgment11 or 
two partial final judgments certified as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b), irrespective of whether there 
were numerous partial judgments previously entered. The district court had the discretion of 
entering either form of judgment, but he rightfully elected to enter the two Final Amended 
Judgments, which were certified as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b). (SA. 33-38.) The district court did 
not err in doing so and those judgments fully comply with I.R.C.P. 54. 
2. This Court Should Construe I.R.C.P. 54 Harmoniously with Other Applicable Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Idaho Appellate Rules, Keeping in Mind this 
Court's Mandate to Interpret the Civil Rules of Procedure Justly and in a Manner 
that Ensures that this Court Addresses Taylor's Appeal on the Merits Rather than 
on a Technicality. 
In addition to the clear, plain and ordinary meaning of I.R.C.P. 54 as discussed in Section 
C(l) above, the interpretation of I.R.C.P. 54 with other Rules of Civil Procedure and certain 
Appellate Rules also supports the conclusion that the Final Amended Judgments, certified as final 
under I.R.C.P. 54(b), were the final and appealable judgments for this appeal-not the partial 
consent judgment previously entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow. 
10 (E.g., R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35); Aug. p. 1-18 
(SA 46-63).)Athay, 153 Idaho at 823,291 P.3d at 1022; Seiniger Law Office, P.A., 145 Idaho at 
247, 178 P.3d at 612. 
11 I.R.C.P. 54 uses the singular term ''judgment"-which should be construed liberally in 
Taylor's favor on this appeal to ensure a just determination of this appeal and the entire record 
submitted on appeal based on the merits rather than on a technicality. Compare Minich v. Gem 
State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911,591 P.2d 1078 (1979) (stating that under stator construction 
the singulartermjudge includes the plural judges); with Athay, 153 Idaho at 823,291 P.3d at 1022 
and Seiniger Law Office, P.A., 145 Idaho at 247, 178 P.3d at 612. 
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When construing and interpreting judgments or orders to determine whether they 
constituted a final and appealable judgment, this Court has harmonized its interpretation with other 
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Appellate Rules. See, e.g., Spokane Structures, Inc., 148 Idaho 
at 619-21, 226 P.3d at 1266-68; Camp, 137 Idaho at 866-68, 55 P.3d at 320-22. 
In other words, the Rules are to be applied not as a set of isolated precepts but as a 
harmonious whole. A single Rule cannot be read in a vacuum; it must be read in 
light of the statutory commands of the federal judicial code and of the structure of 
the entire Rules of Civil Procedure. The courts in administering the Rules have the 
duty of giving full expression to the clear meaning of the words used without one 
Rule nullifying another. 
35A C.J.S. FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 18 (2017) (foot notes omitted). 
Here, the plain, ordinary and clear meaning of other Rules of Civil Procedure and certain 
Appellate Rule interpreted harmoniously with I.R.C.P. 54 further supports the conclusion that in a 
multi-party and multi-claim lawsuit there must be one final judgment that includes all of the relief 
granted or denied as to all of the parties-and any other lawsuit for that matter. 12 Thus, the district 
court's two "Final Amended Judgments" entered in favor of Riley and HTEH, certified as final 
under I.R.C.P. 54(b), are the only two final and appealable judgments entered in this lawsuit, and 
the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and Turnbow is just that-a non-
final and non-appealable partial judgment. It would be unjust hyper technically interpret the Rules 
of Civil Procedure (including I.R.C.P. 54) and the Appellate Rules against Taylor based on the 
12 Unless, of course, a partial judgment is certified as final pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b)-this 
would conclusively resolve certain claims against certain parties in a multi-party lawsuit, which 
would result in the final judgment excluding those parties and/or claims that were certified as final 
under I.R.C.P. 54(b). Ironically, that was done here for Riley and HTEH. (SA. 33-38.) 
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peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, which would not ensure that this Court reaches the 
merits of Taylor's appeal and without disposing of certain issues based on a technicality. (E.g., R. 
6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35); Aug. p. 1-18 (SA 46-63).) Athay, 
153 Idaho at 823,291 P.3d at 1022; Seiniger Law Office, P.A., 145 Idaho at 247, 178 P.3d at 612. 
First, "[t]hese rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding." I.R.C.P. l(a) (2015) (SA. 1 ). It would be unjust 
and expensive, and result in further delays, to interpret the Rules of Civil Procedure (including 
I.R.C.P. 54) liberally against Taylor based on the facts and circumstances here. 
Second, the then-applicable I.R.C.P. l l(a)(2)(B) provided that a motion for 
reconsideration may be brought at any time before the filing of a "final judgment" or no later than 
fourteen days after the filing of such a judgment. I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) (2015) (SA. 2). Again, it 
would be unjust and fair, not to mention a technicality, to disregard Taylor's motion for 
reconsideration based on the facts and circumstances. This is particularly true because the district 
court's clerk had notified all parties prior to filing the partial consent judgment in favor of Eberle 
Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow that the district court intended for that judgment not to be a final 
one and the Final Amended Judgments that were later filed were prepared and submitted by Riley 
and HTEH's counsel. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35); Aug. 
p. 1-18 (SA 46-63).) 
Third, I.R.C.P. 59(e) provided that "[a] motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be 
served not later than fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment." I.R.C.P. 59(e) (2015) (SA. 
4). Taylor had stipulated only with Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow for the dismissal of 
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the claims against him after they settled at mediation. (R. 6299, 6305-09 (SA. 23-27), 6310-11 
(SA. 28-29).) Taylor had nothing to appeal with regard to the partial judgment entered in favor of 
Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow (even if it was a final judgment). (Id.) In other words, in 
order for I.R.C.P. 59(e) to even be implicated, this required the district court to enter final and 
appealable judgments in favor of Riley and HTEH. This is precisely what the district court did. 
(SA. 33-38.) This triggered Taylor's rights under I.R.C.P. 59(e) and the deadline under that rule 
for filing a motion for reconsideration. I.R.C.P. 59(e); I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B). 
Fourth, I.R.C.P. 61 provided that "no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything 
done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for ... vacating, modifying, or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any 
error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 
I.R.C.P. 61 (2015) (SA. 4). Again, based on the circumstances of this case, it would be unjust and 
a miscarriage of justice to throw out Taylor's motion for reconsideration and the three declarations 
submitted in support of that motion on a technicality that has prejudiced no one-indeed, Riley 
and HTEH's counsel prepared and submitted the two Final Amended Judgments entered in favor 
of Riley and HTEH. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35); Aug. p. 
1-18 (SA 46-63).) 
Fifth, I.R.C.P. 69(a) provided that the "[p]rocess to enforce an appealable final judgment or 
partial judgment certified as final under Rule 54(b) for the payment of money, or a court order for 
the payment of money, shall be a writ of execution, unless the court directs otherwise; but no writ 
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of execution may issue on a partial judgment which is not certified as final under Rule 54(b )." 
I.R.C.P. 69(a) (2015) (SA. 4). The clear and plain reading of this rule states that a party may not 
execute upon a partial judgment that is not certified as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b). This means that 
the prior two non-final judgments entered in favor of Riley and HTEH could not be executed upon 
because they were never certified as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b). (R. 5830-33 (SA. 19-22).) In 
addition, by the clear terms of the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and 
the Estate of Turnbow that judgment was not a final one or certified as final pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
54(b). (SA. 30-32.) The district recognized these problems, which is precisely why it took the 
position that the prior two non-final partial judgments entered in favor of Riley and HTEH needed 
to be certified as final so that Taylor could appeal and Riley and HTEH could execute. (R. 6316-
21 (SA. 33-38).) 
Sixth, I.A.R. 4 provided that "[a]ny party aggrieved by an appealable judgment ... may 
appeal such decision to the Idaho Supreme Court as provided under these rules." I.A.R. 4 (2015) 
(SA. 5). Taylor was not aggrieved by the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin 
and the Estate of Turnbow as a result of his settlement with them at mediation. (R. 6299, 6305-09 
(SA. 23-27), 6310-11 (SA. 28-29).) See, e.g., State ex rel Moore v. Howell, 111 Idaho 963, 965, 
729 P.2d 438, 440 (1986) (This Court has "defined a 'party aggrieved' as any party injuriously 
affected by the iudgment.") (emphasis added); Saint Michael's Monastery v. Steele, 30 Idaho 
609, 167 P. 349 (l 917) ("A party considering himself aggrieved by the final judgment of a district 
court has his plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law by appeal to this court ... "). Riley and 
HTEH were not parties to the stipulation and, in fact, they refused to participate in mediation. (R. 
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6305-09 (SA. 23-27).) Indeed, by the terms of the Stipulation, Taylor could not appeal that partial 
judgment and he certainly had not right to drag Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow back into 
an appeal. Once again, the district court recognized that Taylor was not "aggrieved" by the partial 
consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow, which is, once 
again, why the district court took action to ensure that there were final and appealable judgments 
entered in favor of Riley and HTEH. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 
33-35); Aug. p. 1-18 (SA 46-63).) 
Seventh, I.A.R. 11 provided that "[a]n appeal may be taken from ... [t]inal judgments, as 
defined in Rule 54(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." I.A.R. ll(a)(2) (2015) (SA. 5).) That 
Rule does not state "as defined by other authorities"-it states as defined by I.R.C.P. 54(a). That 
Rule states judgment in the singular form. I.A.R. ll(a)(2). In addition, I.A.R. ll(a)(3) provides 
that "[a]n appeal may be taken from ... O]udgments made pursuant to a partial judgment certified 
by the trial court to be final as provided by Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P." I.A.R. ll(a)(3). The partial 
consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow did not technically 
comply with I.R.C.P. 54(a) or I.R.C.P. 54(b) because "[a] judgment is final if either it has been 
certified as final pursuant to subsection (b )(1) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all 
claims for relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action." (R. 6313-
15 (SA. 30-32).) That judgment simply involved two of the at least four parties and it was not 
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certified as final. (Id.) While this Court has rendered a number of decisions that state otherwise, 13 
Taylor is maintaining that this Court should liberally construe the rules in his favor to ensure a just 
appeal and that this Court decides this appeal on the merits rather than a technicality. Athay, 153 
Idaho at 823,291 P.3d at 1022; Seiniger Law Office, P.A., 145 Idaho at 247, 178 P.3d at 612. 
Finally, after interpreting and construing the rules stated above with the interpretation of 
I.R.C.P. 54 articulated in Section C( 1) above and considering the facts and circumstances in this 
case (which are distinguishable from any other prior decision from this Court), this Court should, 
"consistent with the mandate of l.R.C.P. l(a) .. . construe the provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure liberally in order to resolve cases on their merits instead of on technicalities." Seiniger 
Law Office, P.A., 145 Idaho at 247, 178 P.3d at 612. 
3. The Partial Consent Judgment Entered in Favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of 
Turnbow Was Ambiguous Because this Lawsuit Involved Five Different Parties and 
Multiple Claims Against Each Party and, Thus, This Court Should Look at the 
Entire Record (including the Augmented Record) to Ascertain the Intent of the 
District Court and the Parties-Which Unequivocally Demonstrates that the 
District Court and All of the Parties Never Intended that the Partial Judgment 
Entered in Favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow Be a Final Judgment. 
This Court should look to the record to determine the district court's intent because there 
is no doubt that this Court must look beyond the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle 
Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow to ascertain the district court's intent when it entered that partial 
13 See, e.g., Estate of Holland v. Metro. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 94, 99, 279 
P.3d 80, 85 (2012); Harrison v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 149 Idaho 201, 205, 
233 P.3d 132, 136 (2010); Skaggs v. Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co., 141 Idaho 114, 106 P 
.3d 440 (2005); Camp, 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304; Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 
362 (1999); Hunting v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho 634,637,931 P .2d 628,631 
(1997). Taylor respectfully asserts that a bright-line rule should be adopted. (See Section E.) 
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consentjudgment. (Compare R. 25-50 with R. 6313-15 (SA 30-32).) 
"The same rules of interpretation apply [to a judgment] as in ascertaining the meaning of 
any other writing." Evans, 11 P.2d at 367. If this Court "finds [a] judgment ambiguous, it may 
refer to the circumstances surrounding the making of the judgment in attempting to interpret it." 
Lester, 104 Idaho at 245, 658 P.2d at 916. Simply put, 
In applying a judgment, 'if the language be in any degree uncertain, we may 
properly refer to the circumstances surrounding the making of the order or 
judgment, to the condition of the cause in which it was entered.' 
Evans, 11 P.2d at 367. 
A judgment must be construed in light of the situation of the court, what was before 
it, and the accompanying circumstances ... An ambiguity in a judgment exists when 
language can be reasonably construed as having at least two alternative meanings. 
If there is uncertainty and ambiguity in a judgment, the reviewing court must 
construe it so as to express the intent of the trial judge. Ifajudgment is ambiguous, 
a reviewing court determines its meaning by examining the entire judgment, and 
particular words cannot be isolated from the judgment but must be 
considered ... When interpreting a judgment, effect must be given to that which is 
clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed. 
46 AM. JUR. 2D JUDGMENTS§ 74 (2017) (foot notes omitted). 
In the construction of an ambiguous judgment, the reviewing court may look to 
extrinsic evidence to resolve any ambiguity which includes looking at the entire 
record. Accordingly, the interpretation of a judgment may involve the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the judgment. An appellate court may 
look at the entire record, including, but not limited to, the complaint, findings, and 
evidence to ascertain the judgment's meaning and effect. A court may also consider 
the pleadings, the subject matter of the suit, the reasons for the judgment, and other 
matters ofrecord. 
46 AM. JUR. 2D JUDGMENTS § 76 (2017). 
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Here, there is no doubt that the partial judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the 
Estate of Turnbow is ambiguous because it only resolves Taylor's claims against two of the 
defendants. (R. 25-50, 6313-15 (SA. 30-32).) Thus, this Court should look to the record (including 
the augmented record (SA. 46-63)) to ascertain the meaning of that partial judgment and the district 
court's intent at the time that judgment was entered. It was uniformly agreed and understood by 
the district court and all parties that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin 
and the Estate of Turnbow was not intended to be a final and appealable judgment. (R. 6313-15 
(SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35); Aug. p. 1-18 (SA 46-63).) 
More specifically, on September 18, 2015 at 11:32 AM, the district court's clerk emailed 
all counsel to this lawsuit (including counsel for Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow) advising 
them that final judgments were needed: 
Judge Greenwood did sign the proposed order and judgment [for Eberle Berlin and 
the Estate of Turnbow] to this case. But he has a note that you need to submit an 
amended judgment and Rule 54(b) certificate for Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell. 
Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns. 
(Aug. p. 7 (SA. 52).) Later, at 3:06 PM on that same day (after the district court's clarifying email), 
the district court entered the partial consent judgment in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of 
Turnbow, which was the product of the Stipulation only between Taylor and them. 14 (R. 6305-09 
(SA. 23-27), 6313-15 (SA. 30-32).) That partial judgment was nearly identical in form to two other 
partial judgments previously filed in favor of Riley and Hawley Troxell. (R. 1736-37 9SA 12-13), 
14 "It is not the signing, but the filing, of the ... judgment that determines the action. If they 
are filed ... thejudgment is valid." Greene v. Edgington, 37 Idaho 1,214 P. 751, 752 (1923). 
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5037-39 (SA 17-18).) None of these three partial judgments standing alone, or collectively, 
complied with the clear language ofl.R.C.P. 54(a) and (b). (Id.; R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32).) 
On September 19, 2017, Taylor's counsel emailed the district court's clerk stating: "I will 
reach out to Keely and Loren to see ifwe can all agree on the form of the final judgment as to all 
parties and then get something to the judge." (Aug. p. 8 (SA. 53).) Shortly thereafter, Taylor's 
counsel then emailed Loren Ipsen, Keely Duke and Kevin Griffiths ( opposing counsel) stating: 
I propose that we send a joint final judgment for the judge's signature. I think that 
the judgment would simply combine what is [in] the judgment that was recently 
submitted by Keely with the contents of the judgment[ s] previously entered for 
HTEH and Mr. Riley. It seems to me that would be the form necessary. What do 
you both think?" 
(Aug. p. 9 (SA. 54).) 
On September 21, 2015, Riley and HTEH's counsel, Loren Ipsen, emailed Taylor's counsel 
back (and carbon copied other counsel) stating: 
Thanks for your offer, but it appears from Kathy Pataro's email that the Court has 
already signed the proposed order and judgment, which I assume relate to the 
Turnbow estate and Eberle Berlin. Therefore, I think it would be simpler for us just 
to submit final judgments for Hawley Troxell and Mr. Riley as suggested by the 
Court. 
(Aug. p. 10 (SA. 55).) Later that same day (September 21, 2015), Riley and HTEH's counsel had 
his assistant email the district court's clerk with two proposed "Amended Final Judgment[s]", with 
each of them containing an I.R.C.P. 54(b) certificate. (Aug. p. 11-17 (SA. 56-62).) On the next day 
(September 22, 2015), Taylor's counsel emailed the district court's clerk advising her that the 
proposed "Amended Final Judgment[ s ]" were not approved by him and that "the parties did not 
work together to approve the judgments." (Aug. p. 18 (SA. 63).) Taylor's counsel did not object 
24 
to those judgments because he believed that the district court could either certify partial judgments 
as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b) or enter one consolidated judgment for all of the parties and all of the 
claims, i.e., a final judgment that included Riley, HTEH, Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow. 
(Aug. p. 2-3, 9 (SA. 47-48, 54).) 
On October 9, 2015, the district court entered the two "Final Amended Judgment[s]" with 
I.R.C.P. 54(b) certificates, in the identical form prepared and submitted by Riley and HTEH's 
counsel. (R. 6316-19 (SA. 33-38); Aug. p. 11-17 (SA. 56-62).) 
Accordingly, based on the facts and circumstances stated above, there is no doubt that the 
district court and the parties believed and proceeded in a manner consistent with the understanding 
that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was 
not a final and appealable judgment. To hold otherwise would be manifestly unjust and would 
further result in Taylor's appeal not being fully decided on the merits, but instead being decided 
on a technicality. 
However, even if the record is not augmented with recently filed declaration from the 
undersigned counsel (SA. 46-63), there is still sufficient information to ascertain the intent of the 
district court and the parties from the judgments entered (in particular the later Final Amended 
Judgments for HTEH and Riley) and the failure of anyone to object or proceed in any manner other 
than under the belief that the only final and appealable judgments were the two entered in favor of 
Riley and HTEH. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35), 6322-6404, 
6432-71; 12/9/15 Tr., p. 54-97.) There is no doubt that the district court intended that those two 
judgments would be the final ones. (R. 6316-21 (SA. 33-38).) There is no reason why the district 
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court would have entered, on its own accord, two Final Amended Judgments if he had intended 
that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow be 
the final and appealable judgment. 
4. At Most, the District Court's Entry of the Two Final Amended Judgments in Favor 
of Riley and HTEH and the Prior Partial Judgment in Favor of Eberle Berlin and 
the Estate of Tunbow and Any Timeliness Issues Pertaining to Taylor's Motion for 
Reconsideration Was Harmless Error and Riley and HTEH Invited Any Error and 
Waived any Errors for Not Objecting before the District Court. 
Riley and HTEH have not been prejudiced by any act of the district court or Taylor, they 
never objected to any issue regarding the entry of the Final Amended Judgments and the 
proceedings relating to Taylor's motion for reconsideration. Simply put, this Court should 
disregard those issues entirely, and HTEH and Riley are responsible for inviting any errors 
no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court 
or by any of the parties is ground for ... vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing 
a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must 
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties. 
I.R.C.P. 61 (2015) (SA. 4). 
Here, Riley and HTEH participated and invited any errors in the proceedings to enter the 
judgments. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35); Aug. p. 1-18 (SA 
46-63).) Indeed, Riley and HTEH were the ones who prepared and submitted the two Final 
Amended Judgments that the district court ultimately signed and entered. (Id.) Moreover, Riley 
and HTEH never complained or objected to the manner in which the district court was proceeding 
and the method that he later entered the Final Amended Judgments. (Id.) 
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Significantly, Taylor's notice of appeal was timely filed and served within 42 days of the 
date of the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow 
and the two Final Amended Judgments entered in favor of Riley and HTEH. (R. 63113-14 (SA. 
30-32), 6316-21 (SA. 33-38), 6406-31.) Thus, there is no prejudice in that regard. 
And since Taylor's motion for reconsideration was not submitted to amend the partial 
judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow, then there is no prejudice 
as to any alleged untimeliness of Taylor's motion for reconsideration, so there is no prejudice in 
that regard either. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35), 6322-6404, 
6432-71; 12/9/15 Tr., p. 54-97; Resp'ts' Br. at 1-59.) 
Thus, Riley and HTEH have not been prejudiced by any act of the district court and they, in 
fact, invited any error in the proceeding relative to the entry of the various judgments and the 
timing of Taylor's motion for reconsideration. I.R.C.P. 61. Put another way, Riley and HTEH are 
"barred under the invited error doctrine from raising this as an error on appeal." Taylor v. 
McNichols, 149 Idaho 826,832,243 P.3d 642,648 (2010). 
5. Since Taylor Was Not Moving to Reconsider the Partial Judgment Entered in Favor 
of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow (Nor Could He), His Motion for 
Reconsideration Is Not a Jurisdictional Issue Because It Must Be Presumed that 
Judge Greenwood Would Have Enlarged Time. 
Even assuming that Taylor's motion for reconsideration was untimely because this Court's 
holds that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow 
was, in fact, a final and appealable judgment. Taylor was not appealing or seeking any relief from 
that partial judgment (nor could he) so I.R.C.P. 59(a) has no application here. Moreover, HTEH 
and Riley invited any error or irregularity in terms of the district court's entry of the Final Amended 
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Judgments, certified as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b), and they waived any objection to the timeliness 
of Taylor's motion for reconsideration by not raising the issue before the district court. 
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be 
made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) 
days after the entry of the final judgment. A motion for reconsideration of any order 
of the trial court made after entry of final judgment may be filed within fourteen 
(14) days from the entry of such order; provided, there shall be no motion for 
reconsideration of an order of the trial court entered on any motion filed under 
Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b). 
I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) (2015) (SA. 2). 
The record fails to disclose that an objection to the timeliness of Glen's claim was 
made before the magistrate. Rather, the question of timeliness appears to have been 
raised for the first time on appeal. In general, appellate courts in Idaho will not 
consider issues newly raised. E.g., Masters v. State, 105 Idaho 197, 668 P.2d 73 
(1983); Green v. Young, 102 Idaho 735, 639 P.2d 433 (1981). Although an 
exception to this rule applies to jurisdictional issues, we do not deem the 
purportedly late filing to represent a jurisdictional defect. Even if Rules 54( d)( 5) 
and 54(e)(5) were applicable, the magistrate would have been authorized, upon a 
showing of good cause, to extend the time for filing memoranda of costs and 
attorney fees. Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P .2d 
1067 (1983). 
Matter of Estate of Kunzler, 109 Idaho 350,353, 707 P.2d 461,464 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Here, even assuming that the partial judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the 
Estate of Turnbow was a final judgment, Taylor's motion for reconsideration was not seeking to 
amend that judgment and thus I.R.C.P. 59(a) was not implicated and there are no jurisdictional 
issues. Moreover, Riley and HTEH never objected to the alleged untimeliness of Taylor's motion 
for reconsideration. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35), 6322-
6404, 6432-71; 12/9/15 Tr., p. 54-97; Resp'ts' Br. at 1-59.) Indeed, Riley and HTEH proceeded in 
the same manner as Taylor in terms of believing that the partial consent judgment entered in favor 
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of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was not a final and appealable judgment, and Riley 
and HTEH invited any errors associated with the entry of the Final Amended Judgments and the 
timing of Taylor's subsequent motion for reconsideration because they prepared and submitted 
those Final Amended Judgments to the district court for entry, which it did. (R. 6313-15 (SA. 30-
32), 6316-18 (SA. 36-38), 6319-21 (SA 33-35); Aug. p. 1-18 (SA 46-63).) 
This Court recently held that "the district court could have granted permission to serve 
untimely documents in support of the motion for reconsideration had Lava Beds and Exergy 
Development requested an extension of time ... but Lava Beds and Exergy Development did not do 
so." Fagen, Inc., 159 Idaho at 634, 364 P.3d at 1199. This same rationale applies here to Taylor's 
motion for reconsideration and the declarations submitted in support of that motion. 
Thus, because the district court could have enlarged time for Taylor to file his motion for 
reconsideration and the declarations submitted with that motion. I.R.C.P. 6(b) (2015) (SA. 1). 
Because this Court should assume that motion would have been granted based on the facts and 
circumstances, which favorably resolves any alleged jurisdictional issues in Taylor's favor. Matter 
of Estate of Kunzler, 109 Idaho at 353, 707 P.2d at 464. 
D. Even If this Court Holds that the Partial Consent Judgment Entered in Favor of Eberle 
Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow Was a Final and Appealable Judgment and Thus 
Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration and the Three Declarations Submitted With that 
Motion Are Not Properly Before this Court, Taylor's Notice of Appeal Was Still Timely 
and All of the Issues on Appeal Were Previously Asserted before the District Court and 
Are Supported by Other Evidence in the Record. 
If this Court agrees that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and 
the Estate of Turnbow was a final and appealable judgment, then Taylor's notice of appeal was 
still timely filed within 42 days of that judgment, and his appeal automatically entitles him to 
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appeal other judgments and orders. (R. 63113-14 (SA. 30-32), 6406-31.) I.A.R. 11 (2015); I.A.R. 
14(a) (2015); I.A.R. 17(c)(l) (2015) (SA. 5-8). 
While Taylor cited primarily to the evidence submitted in support of reconsideration for 
his appeal, all of his arguments were asserted in other motions and are supported in large part by 
other evidence in the record. As such, in an abundance of caution, Taylor will provide those 
additional citations to the record for each issue on appeal. Before addressing specific issues, even 
without the record developed on Taylor's motion for reconsideration, the rest of the previously 
developed record contained significant arguments, testimony, exhibits and at least one Affidavit 
from Richard T. McDermott-all of which support reversal on all issues asserted on appeal without 
the need of the motion for reconsideration (including the efforts to obtain Riley's concealed facts). 
(E.g., R. 25-50, 66, 86, 111, 114-1360, 945-46, 1463-1544, 1573-81, 1632-62, 1703-35, 1798, 
1891-2433, 2444-2515, 253-55, 2575-90, 2610-35, 2663-75, 2688-3388, 3484-3715, 3821-34, 
3841-4048, 4054-55, 4109-15, 4217-54, 4284-4314, 4437-4486.) 
1. Taylor Asserted Ripeness and that His Claims Were Not Ripe Until After Babbitt. 
Taylor maintains that his claims here accrued after his complaint was dismissed in Babbitt. 
(Appellant's Br. at 14-17; Errata Re: Appellant's Br. at 2.; E.g., R. 1463-87, 1477-78, 1494-95, 
1531-32, 2828-3377, 2478-80, 2493, 4449-53, 4456-57.) 
2. Taylor Asserted that His Negligence/Malpractice Claim Against Riley Did Not 
Accrue and There Was No Objective Proof of Some Damage and Fraudulent 
Concealment. 
Taylor maintains that his malpractice/assumed duty claims did not accrue until he had 
objected proof of some damage, which was no earlier than Judge Bruide's decision finding the 
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SRA illegal and unenforceable on June 17, 2009 and that other claims accrued later based on 
fraudulent concealment. (Appellant's Br. at 16-23; Errata Re: Appellant's Br. at 2-3; E.g., R. 1463-
87, 1499-1502, 1501, 1517-19, 2478-80, 2493, 2828-3377.) 
3. Taylor Asserted that His Fraud Claims Constituted a New Transaction and They 
Were Also Not Ripe Until After Babbitt. 
Taylor maintains that his fraud, constructive fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims 
were not ripe before Judge Brudie's illegality decision, were based on new facts after Babbitt, and 
that he could not have discovered the fraud any earlier than when Riley finally came clean in 2012. 
(Appellant's Br. at 26-31; E.g., R. 1463-87, 1531-32, 1720, 2828-3377, 4444-49, 4455-56.) 
4. Taylor Asserted that His Fraud Claims Here Are Different Because the Fraud 
Argument that He Made in Taylor v. AL4 Was a Defense to the Illegality Doctrine. 
Taylor maintains that res judicata or collateral estoppel does not apply to his fraud claims 
because his assertion of fraud in Taylor v. AJA was solely a defense to the illegality doctrine and 
he could not have asserted fraud against Riley in that lawsuit. (E.g., 813-22, 1463-87, 1482-83, 
1497-99, 1720, 2828-3377, 4455-59.) 
5. Taylor Asserted that His Fraud Claims Here Are Not Barred by Collateral Estoppel 
Because He Did Not Have a Fair Opportunity to Litigate His Fraud Claim in Taylor 
v.AL4. 
Taylor maintains that his fraud claims here are not barred by collateral estoppel because he 
did not have a fair opportunity to litigate those claims and was procedurally prevented from 
deposing Riley. (Appellant's Br. at 32-41; E.g., R. 813-22, 1463-87, 1497-99, 1720, 2828-3377, 
4457-59.) 
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6. Taylor Asserted that Riley Owed Him Fiduciary Duties Through the Opinion Letter 
and/or a Special Relationship of Trust and Confidence. 
Taylor maintains that Riley owed him fiduciary duties through the opinion letter and/or his 
historical relationship of trust and confidence. (Appellant's Br. at 27, 45-48; Errata re: Appellant's 
Br. at 3-4; E.g., R. 813-22, 1463-87, 2452-58.) 
7. Taylor Asserted that this Court Should Expand Duffin to Include the Tort of 
Negligent Misrepresentations Against Attorneys. 
Taylor maintains that this Court should extend negligent misrepresentation claims to be 
asserted against attorneys who provide opinion letters and expand that claim to include omissions 
of fact. (Appellant's Br. at 41-45; E.g., R. 813-22, 1463-87, 1505-07, 1519-22, 1534-35.) 
8. Taylor Asserted that HTEH Was Liable for the Damages Caused by Riley During 
the Time that Riley Was a Partner at HTEH. 
Taylor maintains that HTEH is liable for damages attributable to acts and/or omissions from 
Riley during the time that he was a partner at HTEH. (Appellant's Br. at 48-49; Errata re: 
Appellant's Br. at 4; E.g., R. 813-22, 1463-87, 1543, 3378-87.) 
9. Taylor Asserted that Riley's Opinions Were Misleading and that He Omitted the 
Reasoning from His Opinion Letter. 
Taylor maintains that Riley's opinions were misleading because he omitted the required 
reasoning and disclosures from his opinion letter. (See generally Appellant's Br. at 15-48; E.g., R. 
813-22, 1463-87, 1720, 2446-58, 2828-3377, 3378-87.) 
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E. This Court Should Adopt a Bright-Line Rule that there Must Be Only One Final 
Judgment (Subject to I.R.C.P. 54(b)) and that the Final Judgment Must Include All 
Parties to the Action and Combine Any Prior Partial Judgments into the Final 
Judgment. 
Based on the arguments and authorities addressed in Section C above, Taylor respectfully 
suggests to this Court that it should consider adopting a new bright-line rule that all final judgments 
must address all of the parties and all of the claims asserted in a lawsuit in one consolidated final 
judgment. This would conclusively eliminate any confusion regarding these issues. 
F. To the Extent This Court Would Like Additional Oral Argument on Any or All of the 
Above Issues, Taylor's Counsel Will Make Himself Promptly Available. 
If this Court desires additional oral argument, Taylor's counsel will alter or revise his 
schedule to the extent possible to participate in any further oral argument. See generally I.A.R. 37. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Court should hold that the partial consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin 
and the Estate of Turnbow was a non-final partial consent judgment and that the Final Amended 
Judgments, certified a final under I.R.C.P. 54(b), are the final and appealable judgments for this 
appeal. In the alternative, this Court should still hold that Taylor's motion for reconsideration was 
timely. 
If this Court finds that Taylor's motion for reconsideration was not timely, then this Court 
can still decide all of the issues on appeal on the merits because he preserved all of the issues for 
appeal in prior motions and they are supported by evidence in the record. 
Lastly, Taylor respectfully suggest that this Court should consider adopting a new bright-
line rule with regard to the entry of one final judgment to rectify all confusion regarding the issue. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of August, 2017. 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 21st day of August, 2017, I caused to be served 
two (for each party) true and correct copies of the foregoing to the following parties: 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
James D. LaRue 
Loren C. Ipsen 
Elam & Burke, PA 
251 East Front St., Suite 300 
Boise, ID 83701 
Fax: (208) 384-5844 
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Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile - (208) 384-5844 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) (By Agreement) 
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APPLICABLE RULES AS THEY EXISTED IN 20151 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule l(a). Scope of Rules. 
These rules govern the procedure and apply uniformly in the district courts and the magistrate's 
divisions of the district courts in the state of Idaho in all actions, proceedings and appeals of a 
civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, including probate proceedings and 
proceedings in which a judge pro tempore is appointed pursuant to Idaho Court Administrative 
Rule 4; except that certain proceedings in the magistrate's division involving family law and the 
Domestic Violence Crime Prevention Act are governed by the Idaho Rules of Family Law 
Procedure as set forth in IRFLP 101 and proceedings in the small claims department are 
governed by these rules only as provided by Rule 81. All references in these rules to the court or 
district court shall include the magistrate's division, and all references to judges or clerks shall 
include magistrates and their clerks and a judge pro tempore appointed pursuant to Idaho Court 
Administrative Rule 4, except as referred to in Rules 81, 82 and 83. These rules shall be liberally 
construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding. 
(Amended March 17, 2006, effective July 1, 2006; amended March 9, 2015, effective July 1, 
2015.) 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 6(b ). Enlargement. 
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or 
allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the parties, by written stipulation, which does 
not disturb the orderly dispatch of business or the convenience of the court, filed in the action, 
before or after the expiration of the specified period, may enlarge the period, or the court for 
cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the 
period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally 
prescribed or as extended by previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable 
neglect; but the time may not be extended for taking any action under rules 50(b ), 52(b ), 59(b ), 
( d), ( e ), and 60(b) except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a)(l). General Rules of Pleading - Claims for Relief. 
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) if the court be of limited jurisdiction, a short and 
plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, (2) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for 
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several 
different types may be demanded. 
1 The applicable rules in this Appendix were copied and pasted verbatim from this Court archived website on August 
10, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20150810 I 024 l 9/http://www.isc.idaho.gov:80/ircp (last visited on August 20, 
2017). This website is known as the WayBack Machine and it archives numerous websites at various times over many 
years. 
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule ll(a)(2). Successive Applications for Orders or Writs -
Motions for Reconsideration. 
(A) Successive Applications. In any action, if an application by any party to the judge of a court 
for the issuance of an order or writ is denied in whole or in part by such judge, neither the party 
nor the party's attorney shall make any subsequent application to any other judge except by 
appeal to a higher court; provided that a second application may be made for a constitutional writ 
after a disclosure of the first application has been made to the second judge. Any writ or order 
obtained in violation of this section shall be immediately vacated by the judge issuing the same 
upon discovery of the prior application to another judge, and the party and the attorney shall be 
subject to such costs and sanctions as the court may determine in its discretion. Nothing in this 
rule shall prevent a party or the attorney from renewing a motion or an application to the same 
judge, or a newly appointed judge, in an action after such motion or application was originally 
denied; but this provision and this rule shall not create the right to file a motion for 
reconsideration except as provided in subsection (B) of this rule. Nothing in this rule shall 
prevent a party or an attorney from renewing a motion or an application for a constitutional writ 
to the same judge, or a newly appointed judge, in an action after such motion or application was 
originally denied. 
(B) Motion For Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the 
trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen 
(14) days after the entry of the final judgment. A motion for reconsideration of any order of the 
trial court made after entry of final judgment may be filed within fourteen ( 14) days from the 
entry of such order; provided, there shall be no motion for reconsideration of an order of the trial 
court entered on any motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 
60(b). 
(Adopted June 15, 1987, effective November 1, 1987; amended March 20, 1991, effective July 1, 
1991.) 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(a). Judgments - Definition - Form. 
"Judgment" as used in these rules means a separate document entitled "Judgment" or "Decree". 
A judgment shall state the relief to which a party is entitled on one or more claims for relief in 
the action. Such relief can include dismissal with or without prejudice. A judgment shall not 
contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, the record of prior proceedings, the court's 
legal reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions of law. A judgment is final if either it has been 
certified as final pursuant to subsection (b X 1) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all 
claims for relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action. A 
judgment shall begin with the words "JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: .. ," and it 
shall not contain any other wording between those words and the caption. A judgment can 
include any findings of fact or conclusions of law expressly required by statute, rule, or 
regulation. 
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(Amended March 29, 2010; effective July 1, 2010; amended April 2, 2014; effective July 1, 
2014.) 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b). Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving 
Multiple Parties. 
( 1) Certificate of Final Judgment. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, 
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim, or when multiple parties are 
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of 
the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and 
upon an express direction for the entry of the judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than 
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of less than all the parties shall not terminate the actions 
as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at 
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of 
all the parties. If any parties to an action are entitled to judgments against each other such as on a 
claim and counterclaim, or upon cross-claims, such judgments shall be offset against each other 
and a single judgment for the difference between the entitlements shall be entered in favor of the 
party entitled to the larger judgment. In the event the trial court determines that a judgment 
should be certified as final under this Rule 54(b ), the court shall execute a certificate which shall 
immediately follow the court's signature on the judgment and be in substantially the following 
form: 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby CERTIFIED, 
in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined that there is no just reason 
for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby direct that the 
above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an 
appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this ____ day of ________ , 20 __ _ 
(Signature - District Judge) 
(2) Jurisdiction if Appealed After Rule 54(b) Certificate. If a Rule 54(b) Certificate is issued on 
a partial judgment and an appeal is filed, the trial court shall lose all jurisdiction over the entire 
action, except as provided in Rule 13 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
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(Amended December 19, 1975, effective January 1, 1976; amended March 31, 1978, effective 
July 1, 1978; amended April 11, 1979, effective May 1, 1979; amended March 27, 1989, 
effective July 1, 1989.) 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(c). Demand for Judgment. 
A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in 
the demand for judgment. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, 
every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e). Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. 
A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than fourteen (14) days after 
entry of the judgment. 
(Amended June 15, 1987, effective November 1, 1987.) 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 61. Harmless Error. 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling 
or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for 
granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard 
any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 69. Execution - In General. 
(a) Process to enforce an appealable final judgment or partial judgment certified as final under 
Rule 54(b) for the payment of money, or a court order for the payment of money, shall be a writ 
of execution, unless the court directs otherwise; but no writ of execution may issue on a partial 
judgment which is not certified as final under Rule 54(b ). Provided, a writ of execution shall not 
issue for an amount other than the face amount of the judgment, and costs and attorney fees 
approved by the court, without an affidavit of the party or the party's attorney verifying the 
computation of the amount due under the judgment. The clerk may rely upon such an affidavit in 
issuing a writ of execution. After service of the writ of execution, the sheriff shall make a return 
to the clerk of the court and indicate thereon the amount of the service fees and whether all of 
such fees were collected by the sheriff upon the service of the writ of execution. Any balance of 
the service fees of the writ of execution not collected by the sheriff shall be added to the 
judgment by the clerk as provided in Rule 54( d). 
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(b) The procedure on execution, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment, and in 
proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment, and in proceedings on and in aid of 
execution shall be in accordance with the statutes of the state ofldaho and as provided in these 
rules. 
( c) Obtaining Discovery: In aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor or successor 
in interest when that interest appears of record, may obtain discovery from any person, including 
the judgment debtor, as provided in these rules and may examine any person, including the 
judgment debtor, in the manner provided by the practice of this state. 
(Amended January 8, 1976, effective March 1, 1976; am. July 2, 1976, effective October 1, 
1976; amended March 23, 1983, effective July 1, 1983; amended June 15, 1987, June 17, 1987, 
effective July 1, 1987; amended April 29, 2013, effective July 1, 2013.) 
Idaho Appellate Rule 4. Persons Who May Appeal. 
Any party aggrieved by an appealable judgment, order or decree, as defined in these rules, of a 
district court, the Public Utilities Commission or the Industrial Commission may appeal such 
decision to the Supreme Court as provided in these rules. 
(Adopted March 25, 1977, effective July 1, 1977.) 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. Appealable Judgments and Orders. 
An appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the Supreme Court from the following judgments 
and orders: 
(a) Civil Actions. From the following judgments and orders of a district court in a civil action: 
(1) Final judgments, as defined in Rule 54(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, including 
judgments of the district court granting or denying peremptory writs of mandate and prohibition. 
(2) Decisions by the district court dismissing, affirming, reversing or remanding an appeal. 
(3) Judgments made pursuant to a partial judgment certified by the trial court to be fmal as 
provided by Rule 54(b ), I.R.C.P. 
( 4) Any order or judgment of contempt. 
(5) An order granting or refusing a new trial, including such orders which contain a conditional 
grant or denial of a new trial subject to additur and remittitur. 
(6) An order granting or denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
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(7) Any order made after final judgment including an order denying a motion to set aside a 
default judgment, but excluding an order granting a motion to set aside a default judgment. 
(8) Any order appealable under the Uniform Arbitration Act, Title Seven, Chapter 9 of the Idaho 
Code. 
(9) A district court order designating a person a vexatious litigant pursuant to Idaho Court 
Administrative Rule 59, in which case the notice of appeal may be filed with either the district 
court clerk or the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
(b) Probate Proceedings. From any interlocutory or final judgment or order made after final 
judgment of a district court in a probate proceeding, whether original or appellate, which is or 
would be appealable from the magistrates division to the district court by statute or these rules. 
(c) Criminal Proceedings. From the followingjudgments and orders of the district court in a 
criminal action, whether or not the trial court retains jurisdiction: 
(1) Final judgments of conviction. 
(2) Decisions by the district court dismissing, affirming, reversing or remanding an appeal. 
(3) An order granting a motion to dismiss an information or complaint. 
(4) Any order or judgment, whenever entered and however denominated, terminating a 
criminal action, provided that this provision shall not authorize a new trial in any case where the 
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy would otherwise prevent a second trial. 
(5) Any order, however denominated, reducing a charge of criminal conduct over the 
objection of the prosecutor. 
(6) Any judgment imposing sentence after conviction, except a sentence imposing the death 
penalty which shall not be appealable until the death warrant is issued as provided by statute. 
(7) An order granting a motion to suppress evidence. 
(8) An order granting or denying a motion for new trial. 
(9) Any order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the defendant or the 
state. 
(10) Decisions by the district court on criminal appeals from a magistrate, either dismissing 
the appeal or affirming, reversing or remanding. 
( 11) Any order or judgment of contempt. 
( d) Administrative Proceedings - Industrial Commission. 
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( 1) From any final decision or order of the Industrial Commission or from any final decision 
or order upon rehearing or reconsideration by the administrative agency. 
(2) From any order of the Industrial Commission deciding compensability that the 
Commission has determined should be immediately appealable pursuant to Rule 12.4. Any 
appeal from the order must be taken within fourteen (14) days from the date file stamped by the 
Industrial Commission on the written determination that the order should be immediately 
appealable. The appeal shall be expedited as set forth in Rule 12.4. The failure to appeal the 
order on compensability pursuant to this subsection shall not preclude consideration of the order 
in an appeal taken pursuant to subsection ( 1) of this rule. 
(e) Administrative Proceedings - Public Utilities Commission. From any decision or order of the 
Public Utilities Commission which is appealable to the Supreme Court by statute. 
(f) Administrative Proceedings - Judicial Review of Agency Decisions. From any final decision 
or order of the district court on judicial review of an agency decision. 
(g) Cross-appeals and additional issues on appeal. - After an appeal has been filed from a 
judgment or order specified above in this rule, a timely cross-appeal may be filed from any 
interlocutory or final judgment order or decree. If no affirmative relief is sought by way of 
reversal, vacation or modification of the judgment, order or decree, an issue may be presented by 
the respondent as an additional issue on appeal under Rule 35(b)(4) without filing a cross-appeal. 
(Adopted March 25, 1977, effective July 1, 1977; amended March 31, 1978, effective July 1, 
1978; amended March 24, 1982, effective July 1, 1982; amended March 30, 1984, effective July 
1, 1984; amended March 20, 1985, effective July 1, 1985; amended March 28, 1986, effective 
July 1, 1986; amended June 15, 1987; effective November 1, 1987; amended March 20, 1991, 
effective July 1, 1991, amended March 9, 1999, effective July 1, 1999; amended January 30, 
2001, effective July 1, 2001; amended March 21, 2007, effective July 1, 2007, amended March 
29, 2010, effective July 1, 2010; amended November 20, 2012, effective January 1, 2013; 
amended June 20, 2013, effective July 1, 2013; amended April 23, 2015, effective July 1, 2015.) 
Idaho Appellate Rule 14. Time for Filing Appeals. 
All appeals permitted or authorized by these rules, except as provided in Rule 12, shall be taken 
and made in the manner and within the time limits as follows: 
(a) Appeals From the District Court. Any appeal as a matter of right from the district court may 
be made only by physically filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within 42 
days from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court on any judgment or 
order of the district court appealable as a matter of right in any civil or criminal action. The time 
for an appeal from any civil judgment or order in an action is terminated by the filing of a timely 
motion which, if granted, could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment 
in the action ( except motions under Rule 60 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure or motions 
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regarding costs or attorneys fees), in which case the appeal period for all judgments or orders 
commences to run upon the date of the clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such motion. 
The time for an appeal from any criminal judgment, order or sentence in an action is terminated 
by the filing of a motion within fourteen (14) days of the entry of the judgment which, if granted, 
could affect the judgment, order or sentence in the action, in which case the appeal period for the 
judgment and sentence commences to run upon the date of the clerk's filing stamp on the order 
deciding such motion. If, at the time of judgment, the district court retains jurisdiction pursuant 
to Idaho Code§ 19-2601(4), the length of time to file an appeal from the sentence contained in 
the criminal judgment shall be enlarged by the length of time between entry of the judgment of 
conviction and entry of the order relinquishing jurisdiction or placing the defendant on 
probation; provided, however, that all other appeals challenging the judgment must be brought 
within 42 days of that judgment. Provided, if a criminal judgment imposes the sentence of death, 
the time within which to file a notice of appeal does not commence to run until the death warrant 
is signed and filed by the court. 
(b) Appeals From an Administrative Agency. An appeal as a matter of right from an 
administrative agency may be made only by physically filing a notice of appeal with the Public 
Utilities Commission or the Industrial Commission within 42 days from the date evidenced by 
the filing stamp of the clerk or secretary of the administrative agency on any decision, order or 
award appealable as a matter of right. The time for an appeal from such decision, order or award 
of the industrial commission is terminated by a timely motion for rehearing or reconsideration of 
the decision or order which, if granted, could affect the decision, order or award ( except motions 
regarding costs or attorneys fees), in which case the appeal period commences to run upon the 
date of the filing stamp on the order or decision denying such motion or the decision on 
rehearing or reconsideration. The time for an appeal from such decision, order or award of the 
public utilities commission begins to run when an application for rehearing is denied, or, if the 
application is granted, after the date evidenced by the filing stamp on the decision on rehearing. 
(Adopted March 25, 1977, effective July 1, 1977; amended March 31, 1978, effective July 1, 
1978; amended April 3, 1981, effective July 1, 1981; amended April 18, 1983, effective July 1, 
1983; amended March 30, 1984, effective July 1, 1984; amended March 21, 2007; effective July 
1, 2007, amended March 29, 2010, effective July 1, 2010; amended March 18, 2011, effective 
July 1, 2011.) 
Idaho Appellate Rule 17. Notice of Appeal- Contents. 
A notice of appeal shall contain substantially the following information: 
(a) Title. The title of the action or proceeding. 
(b) Court or Agency Title. The title of the court or agency which heard the trial or proceeding 
and the name and title of the presiding judge or official. 
( c) Case Number. The number assigned to the action or proceeding by the trial court or 
administrative agency. 
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(d) Parties. The name of the appealing party and the party's attorney and the name of the adverse 
party and that party's attorney. An address, phone number and email address must also be given, 
except no email address is required for persons appearing prose. 
( e) Designation of Appeal. 
(1) A Designation of the Judgment or Order Appealed From. The notice of appeal shall designate 
the judgment or order appealed from which shall be deemed to include, and present on appeal: 
(A) All interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment, order or decree 
appealed from, and 
(B) All final judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment or order appealed from for 
which the time for appeal has not expired, and 
(C) All interlocutory or final judgments and orders entered after the judgment or order appealed 
from except orders relinquishingjurisdiction after a period of retained jurisdiction or orders 
granting probation following a period of retained jurisdiction. 
(2) Premature Filing of Notice of Appeal. A notice of appeal filed from an appealable judgment 
or order before formal written entry of such document shall become valid upon the filing and the 
placing the stamp of the clerk of the court on such appealable judgment or order, without refiling 
the notice of appeal. 
(t) Issues. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends to 
assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant 
from asserting other issues on appeal. 
(g) Jurisdictional Statement. A statement as to the basis for the right to appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 of the notice of appeal. 
(h) Transcript. A designation as to whether a transcript is requested, and if requested, whether a 
standard transcript, a supplemented transcript, or a partial transcript as defined in Rule 25 is 
requested by the appellant. The notice shall also state whether appellant's copy of the transcript 
shall be provided in hard copy or electronic format or both. If no election is made within 21 days 
of filing the notice of appeal, the appeallant will receive a hard copy of the transcript. If a 
supplemented transcript is requested, the request shall specifically identify each of the items of 
additional record requested which would otherwise be excluded under Rule 25 ( c ). 
(i) Record. A designation of documents, if any, to be included in the clerk's or agency's record in 
addition to those automatically included pursuant to the following Rule 28. 
G) Exhibits-Civil Cases. A designation of documents, charts, or pictures offered or admitted as 
exhibits in a trial or hearing to be copies and sent to the Supreme Court. 
SA.-9 
(k) Sealed Record. A statement as to whether an order has been entered sealing all or any part of 
the record or transcript. 
(1) Certification. A certification of the attorney of the appellant, or affidavit of the appellant 
representing himself or herself: 
( 1) That service of the notice of appeal has been made upon the reporter of the trial or 
proceeding; 
(2) That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the estimated fees 
for preparation of the designated reporter's transcript as required by Rule 24, or that appellant is 
exempt from paying such fees because of stated reasons; 
(3) That the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record have been paid, or 
that appellant is exempt from paying such fees because of stated reasons; 
(4) That all appellate filing fees have been paid, or that appellant is exempt from paying such 
fees because of stated reasons; and 
(5) That service has been made upon all other parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, 
and that in all cases referred to in Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code, service has been made upon 
the attorney general of the state of Idaho. The appellant shall not be required to certify the 
payment of estimated fees in criminal appeals, appeals from denial of a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus, or petitions for post-conviction relief, if the district court has entered an order, or 
thereafter enters an order within 14 days of filing the notice of appeal, that such costs shall be at 
county expense. 
(m) Amended Notice of Appeal. In the event the original.notice of appeal erroneously states any 
of the information and requirements of this rule or additional facts arise after the filing of the 
initial notice of appeal, the appellant may thereafter file an amended notice of appeal correctly 
setting forth the facts and information. The amended notice of appeal shall indicate changes 
from the original notice of appeal by means of strikethroughs and underlining. An amended 
notice of appeal shall be filed with the clerk of the district court in the same manner as the 
original notice of appeal but no filing fee shall be required. If the original notice of appeal was 
timely filed from an appealable judgment, order or decree, the amended notice of appeal will 
relate back to the date of filing of the original notice of appeal. If the amended notice of appeal 
includes a request for preparation of additional transcripts, the notice must include an estimate of 
the number of additional pages requested and a certification that the amended notice has been 
served on each reporter of whom a request for additional transcript is made. Except in capital 
cases, an amended notice of appeal may not be filed after the record has been filed with the 
Supreme Court. 
(n) Signature. The name and signature of the attorney for the appellant, or name of appellant if 
the appellant does not have an attorney. 
( o) Form. The notice of appeal shall be in substantially the following form: 
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Click here for form. 
(Adopted March 25, 1977, effective July 1, 1977; amended March 31, 1978, effective July 1, 
1978; amended April 11, 1979, effective July 1, 1979; amended December 27, 1979, effective 
July 1, 1980; amended April 18, 1983, effective July 1, 1983; amended March 30, 1984, 
effective July 1, 1984; amended June 15, 1987, effective November 1, 1987; amended March 27, 
1989, effective July 1, 1989; amended March 26, 1992, effective July 1, 1992; amended April 3, 
1996, effective July 1, 1996; amended January 30, 2001, effective July 1, 2001; amended March 
24, 2005, effective July 1, 2005; amended January 3, 2008, effective March 1, 2008; amended 
February 4, 2008, effective March 1, 2008; amended March 19, 2009, effective July 1, 2009; 
amended January 4, 2010, effective February 1, 2010, amended March 29, 2010, effective July 1, 
2010; amended March 18, 2011, effective July 1, 2011; amended November 20, 2012, effective 
January 1, 2013.) 
Idaho Appellate Rule 15. Cross-Appeal After an Appeal. 
(a) Right to cross-appeal. After an appeal has been filed, a timely cross-appeal may be filed 
from any interlocutory or final judgment or order. If no affirmative relief is sought by way of 
reversal, vacation or modification of the judgment or order, an issue may be presented by the 
respondent as an additional issue on appeal under Rule 35(b)(4) without filing a cross-appeal. 
(b) Time for filing. A cross-appeal, as a matter of right, may be made only by physically filing 
the notice of cross-appeal with the clerk of the district court or administrative agency within the 
42 day time limit prescribed in Rule 14, as it applies to the judgment or order from which the 
cross-appeal is taken, or within 21 days after the date of filing of the original notice of appeal, 
whichever is later. 
(Adopted March 27, 1989, effective July 1, 1989; amended March 1, 2004,effective July 1, 2004, 
amended March 29, 2010, effective July 1, 2010.) 
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JUN D 3 2010 
J, DAVID NAVA"ti\Q, el@fk 
1iV It JOON§eN 
!Jffiffl' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; HA WLE 
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership; ROBERT M. 
TURNBOW, an individual; and EBERLE, 
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW & 
McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, an Idaho 
corporation; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0918868 
JUDGMENT 
The Court, having entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment on May 10, 2010, granting Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
LLP's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Court having previously entered its Order 
Granting Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on the First and Third Causes of Action of 
Plaintiffs Complaint on April 21, 2010. Therefore, entry of Judgment concerning all claims 
against Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP is now proper. 
Accordingly, JUDGMENT is hereby entered under the standards of the Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56, DISMISSING Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Complaint against Hawley Troxell 





Attorney fees and costs of litigation, if any, will be assessed and ordered in a manner 
consistent with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED thi~g day of May, 2010. 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6~ay ~~O, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Roderick C. Bond 
Michael S. Bissell 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 
Spokane, \Vashington 99201 
Jack S. Gjording 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
P.O. Box 2837 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2837 
James D. LaRue 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
JUDGMENT-2 
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AM ____ F_'~-~ /.~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ST 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, 
TURNBOW & McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868 
QRDER RE MOTION FOR ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT INF A VOR OF RICHARD A. 
RILEY AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION 
AND MOTION FOR ENTRY OF 
AMENDED JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP AND RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION 
This matter came on for oral argument on January 26, 2015, on the Motion for Entry of 
Judgment in favor of Richard A. Riley and Rule 54(b) Certification and the Motion for Entry of 
Amended Judgment in favor of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP and Rule 54(b) 
Certification. Loren C. Ipsen appeared on behalf of defendants Richard A. Riley and Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP. Roderick C. Bond appeared on behalf of plaintiff Reed J. Taylor. 
Good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Entry of Judgment in favor of Richard A. 
' 
Riley is hereby GRANTED and Richard A. Riley's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification is hereby 
DENIED. 
ORDER- I 005037 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Entry of Amended Judgment in favor Of 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP is hereby DENIED and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
LLP's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's request for an award of 
attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred in responding to the motions under I.R.C.P. 11 is 
hereby DENIED. 
DATED this .j__<( day of February, 2015. 
ORDER-2 005038 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .J1J day of "(I J , 2015, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to e served upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Roderick C. Bond / --
Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC --
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400 --
Bellevue, WA 98004 --
--
Michael D. Gaffney _L 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA --
21 OS Coronado Street --
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 --
--
Jack S. Gjording / --
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC --
P.O. Box 2837 --
Boise, ID 83701-2837 --
--
Loren C. Ipsen _L_ 
Jeffrey A. Thomson --
Elam & Burke, P.A. --
P.O. Box 1539 --
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O°PYJl1!Jlill¥.J.0FI 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, 
TURNBOW & McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Case No. CV-OC-0918868 
JUDGMENT 
The Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Richard A. Riley is dismissed in its entirety 
with prejudice. 
. 
Attorney fees and costs of litigation will be assessed and ordered in a manner consistent 
with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Supreme Court 2014 Opinion No. 
86. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/"'". 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this U day of rf b , 2015, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be"served upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Roderick C. Bond / --
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC --
800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite 400 --
Bellevue, WA 98004 --
--
Michael D. Gaffney _L 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA --
2105 Coronado Street --
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 --
--
Jack S. Gjording / --
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC --
P.O. Box 2837 --
Boise, ID 83701-2837 --
--
/ 
James D. LaRue / --
Loren C. Ipsen --
Jeffrey A. Thomson --
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. --
P.O. Box 1539 --
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JIJN 11 2015 
Ada County Clerk JUL O 8 2015 
CHRISTOPHE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OFsfltliE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, 
TURNBOW & McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Case No. CV-OC-0918868 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
The Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Richard A. Riley is dismissed in its entirety 
with prejudice. 
Judgment is entered in favor of Richard A. Riley against Reed J. Taylor for costs.and 
attorney fees in the amount of$239,265.25. 
DATED thisc:9 r- day of June, 2015. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this_§_ day ofn!115, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
, 
Roderick C. Bond / 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC --
601108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900 --
Bellevue, WA 98004 --
--
I 
Michael D. Gaffney I --
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA --
2105 Coronado Street --
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 --
--
I 
Keeley E. Duke I --
Kevin A. Griffiths --
DUKE, SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC --
P. 0. Box 7387 --
Boise, ID 83 707 
I 
James D. LaRue 
, 
--
Loren C. Ipsen --
Jeffrey A. Thomson --
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. --
P.O. Box 1539 --
Boise, ID 83701 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ruDICIAL DIST 
/ 
I 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, 
TURNBOW & McK.L VEEN, CHARTERED, 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Case No. CV-OC-0918868 
AMENDED ruDGMENT 
The Plaintiffs Complaint against Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, is 
dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. 
Judgment is entered in favor of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, against Reed J. 
Taylor for costs and attorney fees in the amount of $25,029.00. 
DATED this .JS_ day of June, 2015. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT - 1 
005832 
SA. - 21 
.. 
• v 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
?4L11 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this_!_ day of~ 2015, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
jndicated below: 
Roderick C. Bond 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
601 108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Michael D. Gaffney 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Keeley E. Duke 
Kevin A. Griffiths 
DUKE, SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
P. 0. Box 7387 
Boise, ID 83707 
James D. LaRue 
Loren C. Ipsen 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2 
_::! U.S. Mail 
-- Hand Delivery 
-- Federal Express 
Facsimile Transmission --
E-mail --
I U.S. Mail --
-- Hand Delivery 




/ U.S. Mail --
-- Hand Delivery 
-- Federal Express 
Facsimile Transmission --
E-mail --
_L U.S. Mail 
-- Hand Delivery 





MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY, ISB No. 3558 
JOHN M. AVONDET, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado St. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Tel: (208) 557-5203 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
601 108th Ave NE, Suite 1900 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Tel: (425) 591-6903 
Fax: (425) 321-0343 
Email: rod@roderickbond.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
CHR1s·roPHEA D. RICH, Cls,rk 
By HALEY MYERS 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, AN INDIVIDUAL; 
PLAINTIFF, 
V. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, AN INDIVIDUAL; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, AN IDAHO LIMITED LIABILITY 
PARTNERSHIP; SHARON CUMMINGS, 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
ESTATE OF ROBERT M. TURNBOW; AND 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW 







SA. - 23 
., 
· The Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor ("Taylor"), Sharon Cummings, Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Robert M. Turnbow ("Cummings") and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, 
Chartered ("Eberle Berlin"), through their undersigned counsel, stipulate as follows: 
1. Taylor's claims against Eberle Berlin and Cummings shall be dismissed with 
prejudice and without an award of attorneys' fees, expert fees or costs to any party. 
2. Taylor, Eberle Berlin and Cummings authorize the Court to enter the order attached 
hereto as Exhibit A. 
DATED this 28th day of August, 2015. 
By: 
'=l._,.-"M.~<-¥/-4"'/r'/Y'----'1'~'-"""'---===--
ely E. Du 
Kevin A. Gr· 
Attorneys for Defendants Cummings and 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen 
STIPULATION - 2 
By:_-1-::9111,--==--~-----
Michael D. ffney, ISB No. 3558 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
006306 
SA.-24 
MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY, ISB No. 3558 
JOHN M. A VONDET, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado St. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Tel: (208) 557-5203 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
601 108th Ave NE, Suite 1900 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Tel: (425) 591-6903 
Fax: (425) 321-0343 
Email: rod@roderickbond.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, 
TURNBOW & McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants. 
ORDER-1 
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868 
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
REMAINING CLAIMS WITHOUT AN 




Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Reed J. 
Taylor's claims against Sharon Cummings, Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow ("Cummings") and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle 
_ Berlin") are hereby dismissed with prejudice and without an award of attorneys' fees, experts' fees 
or costs to any party. 
IT SO ORDERED. 
DATED this __ ~ay of September, 2015. 
ORDER-2 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, , declare that, on the date indicated below, I served 
a true and correct copy of the forgoing Order on the following persons via the methods indicated 
below: 
Keely E. Duke 
Kevin A. Griffiths 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
James D. LaRue 
Loren· C. Ipsen 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Elam & Burke, PA 
251 East Front St. 
Boise, ID 83 704 
Michael D. Gaffney 
John M. Avondet 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado St. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Roderick C. Bond 
Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC 
601 108th Avenue NE, Suite 1900 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Messenger 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Messenger 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Messenger 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Messenger 
Signed this __ day of September, 2015, at Boise, Idaho. 







~'tY .. ,,9 
~~~ '~ri-a#D. GAFFNEY, ISB No. 3558 
c,~M.AVONDET, ISB No. 7438 
~O~ BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado St. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Tel: (208) 557-5203 
Fax: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
601 108th Ave NE, Suite 1900 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Tel: (425) 591-6903 
Fax: (425) 321-0343 
Email: rod@roderickbond.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
FILED?-..," _ 
·'~---------..JP""'-.~ -'=~-
SEP 18 2015 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KA11'1Y PATARO 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
· RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, 
TURNBOW & McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants. 
ORDER-I 
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868 
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
REMAINING CLAIMS WITHOUT AN 
AW ARD OF FEES OR COSTS TO ANY 
PARTY 
006310 
SA. - 28 
·, . 
. . 
Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Reed J. 
Taylor's claims against Sharon Cummings, Personal _Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow ("Cummings") and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered ("Eberle 
Berlin") are hereby dismissed with prejudice and without an award of attorneys' fees, experts' fees 
or costs to any party. 
IT SO ORDERED. 







Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@dukescanlan.com 
Kevin A. Griffiths 
ISB #8187; kag<@dukescanlan.com 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West.River Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 342-3310 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3299 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharon Cummings, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Robert M Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, 
Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered 
¥'Clim---....... ~ .......... 
FILED~~'""' 
-----P.M._ ___ t.)L)'\-'_....., ... 
SEP 18 2015 
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk 
By KATHY PATARO 
O&flUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IpAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMINGS AS PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF 
ROBERT M. TURNBOW and EBERLE, 
BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW & 




Case No. CV OC 0918868 
JUDGMENT 
006313 
SA. - 30 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Judgment is entered as to all claims against Defendants Sharon Cummings, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & 
McKlveen, Chartered, which are dismissed with prejudice. 




SA. - 31 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
: I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~y ~\12015, I caused to be 
served a true copy of the foregoing document, by the methoindicatedbeiow, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
Roderick C. Bond 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE PLLC 
601 108th Avenue NE, Suite 1900 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Telephone (425) 591-6903 
Attorneys/or Plaintiff 
Michael D. Gaffney 
John M. Avondet 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Telephone (208) 523-5171 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
James D. LaRue 
Loren C. Ipsen 
ELAM BURKE, P.A. 
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701-1539 
Telephone (208) 343-5454 
Attorneys for Defendant Richard A. Riley 
Keely E. Duke 
Kevin A. Griffiths 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
1087 West River Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 7387 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone (208) 342-3310 
Attorneys for Defendants Sharon Cummings, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Robert M. Turnbow and Eberle, Berlin, 
Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered 
JUDGMENT-3 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
L] Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile (425) 321-0343 
D Email 
. rod@roderickbond.com 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
IT Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 




M U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
0 Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 




i:sY U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
0 Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 








A.M ---F-1 L__.~: ) £1) ) 0) 
OCT O 9 2015 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D~~ b~CH, ~lark 
By KATHY PATARO 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA oePUTY 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, 
TURNBOW & McKL VEEN~ CHARTERED, 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Case No. CV-OC-0918868 
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT 
The Plaintiffs Complaint against Defendant Richard A. Riley is dismissed in its entirety 
with prejudice. 
Judgment is entered in favor of Richard A. Riley against Reed J. Taylor for costs and 
attorney fees in the amount of $239,26~ 
DATED this U day of C 
~ FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - I 
, 2015. 
006319 
SA. - 33 
RULE54ili)CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above Final Amended Judgment or order it 
is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.RC.P., that the court has determined 
that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and 
does hereby direct that the above Final Amended Judgment or order shall be a final judgment 
upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. ~ 
DATED this (J___ day of~ 
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2 
006320 
SA. - 34 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~Y of([) l~ol5, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in 
the manner indicated below: 
Roderick C. Bond 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
601 108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Michael D. Gaffney 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Keeley E. Duke 
Kevin A. Griffiths 
DUKE, SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
P. 0. Box 7387 
Boise, ID 83707 
James D. LaRue 
Loren C. Ipsen 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 3 
X- U.S. Mail 
-- Hand Delivery 
-- Federal Express 
Facsimile Transmission --
E-mail --
A- U.S. Mail 
-- Hand Delivery 
-- Federal Express 
Facsimile Transmission --
E-mail --
-X- U.S. Mail 
-- Hand Delivery 
-- Federal Express 
Facsimile Transmission --
E-mail --






A.M---F-I -L ~ .. :.1<1) l ~ 
OCT O 9 2015 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS'mJfis1,~eAffi RICH, Clerk 
By KATHY PATARO 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA oePUTY 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an indivi~ual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, 
TURNBOW & McKL VEEN, CHARTERED, 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Case No. CV-OC-0918868 
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT 
The Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is 
dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. 
Judgment is entered in favor of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP against Reed J. 
Taylor for costs and attorney fees ~:f $25,029.00. 
DATED this {_p dar of l... , 2015. 





' ~· ',· . . ·.,,,;.. 
RULE54~)CERTIF1CATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above Final Amended Judgment or order it 
is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined 
that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and 
does hereby direct that the above Final Amended Judgment or order shall be a final judgment 
upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
DATED this .fL_ day of_,,C.....--~----· 
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2 
006317 
SA. - 37 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
· I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi~day of 0~. 2015, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in 
the manner indicated below: 
Roderick C. Bond 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
601 108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Michael D. Gaffney 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Keeley E. Duke 
Kevin A. Griffiths 
DUKE, SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
P. 0. Box 7387 
Boise, ID 83707 
James D. LaRue 
Loren C. Ipsen 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 3 
I 
l U.S. Mail 
-- Hand Delivery 
-- Federal Express 
Facsimile Transmission --
E-mail --
A- U.S. Mail 
-- Hand Delivery 
-- Federal Express 
Facsimile Transmission --
E-mail --
~ U.S. Mail 
-- Hand Delivery 




~ U.S. Mail --
-- Hand Delivery 








IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OFt.f4&0 3 2016 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA ByKATHYPATARO 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, 
TURNBOW & McK.L VEEN, CHARTERED, 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
DEPllTY 
Case No. CV-OC-0918868 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT 
[Defendant Riley] 
The Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Richard A. Riley is dismissed in its entirety 
with prejudice. 
Judgment is entered in favor of Richard A. Riley against Reed J. Taylor for costs and 
attorney fees in the amount of$243,015.25. 
DATED this l day of March; 2016. 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT [Defendant Riley] - 1 
006728 
SA. - 39 
. . 
' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this %~y of March, 2016, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Roderick C. Bond _JL U.S. Mail 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC -- Hand Delivery 
601108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900 -- Federal Express 
Bellevue, WA 98004 -- Facsimile Transmission 
-- E-~ail 
. Jeffrey A. Thomson ~ U.S. Mail 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. -- Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 1539 -- Federal Express 
Boise, ID 83701 -- Facsimile Transmission 
E-mail --
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT [Defendant Riley] - 2 
006729 
SA. - 40 
..... 
A.M 9.b'JF IL~.: , ___ _ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CWAffi 2016 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF $Ytt\sTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By KATHY PATARO 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, 
TURNBOW & McK.L VEEN, CHARTERED, 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants . 
. JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
DEPUTY 
Case No. CV-OC-0918868 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT 
[Defendant Hawley Troxell] 
The Plaintiff's Comp\aint against Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is 
dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. 
Judgment is entered in favor of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP against Reed J. 
Taylor for costs and ~ttorney fee~ in the amount of $28,779.00. 
DATED this_:}_ day of March, 2016. 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT [Defendant Hawley Troxell] • 1 
006724 
SA. - 41 
- .. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~y of March, 2016, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Roderick C. Bond i U.S. Mail 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC Hand Delivery 
601 108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900 -- Federal Express 
Bellevue, WA 98004 -- Facsimile Transmission 
E-mail --
Jeffrey A. Thomson + U.S. Mail ELAM & BURKE, P.A. -- Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 1539 -- Federal Express 
Boise, ID 83701 -- · Facsimile Transmission 
E-mail --
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT [Defendant Hawley Troxell] - 2 
006725 
SA.-42 
RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
601 108th Ave NE, Suite 1900 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Tel: ( 425) 591-6903 
Fax: (425) 321-0343 
Email: rod@roderickbond.com 
Attorney for Appellant Reed J. Taylor 
IN THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
APPELLANT, 
Docket No.: 43686 
District Court Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868 
V. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; AND 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
APPELLANT REED J. TAYLOR'S MOTION 
TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
RESPONDENTS. 
The Appellant Reed J. Taylor ("Taylor") hereby respectfully moves the Court to augment 
the record on this appeal as follows: 
"Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment... [the] clerk's record ... Such a 
motion shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the specific grounds for the request and 
attaching a copy of any document sought to be augmented." I.A.R. 30(a). 
Here, this Court should grant Taylor's motion to augment the record on appeal with: 
Name of Document: Declaration of Roderick C. Bond. 
Date of Filing: August 21, 2017. 
Taylor respectfully requests that the record be augmented with this Declaration because the 
documents and testimony addressed in the Declaration addresses the issue raised by Justice 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD - 1 
SA.· 43 
Eismann for the first time on appeal regarding whether the partial judgment entered in favor of 
Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was a final judgment. The emails exchanged between the 
district court's clerk and the parties conclusively establishes that it was the intent of all parties that 
the partial judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was never 
intended by anyone to be a final and appealable judgment. See, e.g., Evans v. City of American 
Falls, 52 Idaho 7, 11 P.2d 363, 367 (1932) ('"In applying a judgment, if the language be in any 
degree uncertain, we may properly refer to the circumstances surrounding the making of the order 
or judgment, to the condition of the cause in which it was entered."'). In fact, the Amended Final 
Judgments entered by the district court were actually prepared and provided to the district court 
by counsel for Riley and Hawley Troxell. (See Declaration of Roderick C. Bond attached hereto.) 
In addition, other more specific reasons and authorities are addressed in Taylor's 
Supplemental Appellant's Brief, which is being filed contemporaneously with this Motion. 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should grant Taylor's motion to augment the record 
with the attached Declaration of Roderick C. Bond, which is dated and file-stamped August 21, 
2017 and separately numbered starting with "Aug. p. 1" as provided under I.A.R. 30(a). 
A copy of this Motion and the attached Declaration of Roderick C. Bond, which is 
requested to be augmented in the record, are also included in the Appendix attached to the 
Supplemental Appellant's Brief for the convenience of this Court and counsel. 
DATED this 21 51 day of August, 2017. 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
By: -l?" 
Roderick C. Bond, ISB No. 8082 
Attorney for Appellant Reed J. Taylor 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD - 2 
SA.· 44 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 21st day of August, 2017, I caused to be served 
true and correct copies of the foregoing document to the following parties via the method(s) 
indicated below: 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(X) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Jeffrey A. Thomson 
James D. LaRue 
Loren C. Ipsen 
Elam & Burke, PA 
251 East Front St. 
Boise, ID 83704 
Fax: (208) 384-5844 
(X) Email (pdf attachment) (By Agreement) 
Rodenck C. Bond 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD - 3 
SA.-45 
RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082 
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
60 l I 08th Ave. NE, Suite 1900 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Tel: (425) 591-6903 
Fax: ( 425) 321-0343 
Email: rod@rodcrickbond.com 
Attorney for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor 
Electronically Filed 
8/21/2017 4:42 AM 
Fourth Judicial District. Ada County 
Christopher D. Rich. Clerk of the Court 
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO. TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual: 
Plaintiff~ 
V. 
RICHARD A. RILEY. an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMTNGS. Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLTN. KADING, 
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED. 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants. 
I, Roderick C. Bond, declare: 
Case No.: CV-OC-2009-18868 
DECLARATION OF RODERICK C. BOND 
1. I am the attorney for the plaintiff Reed Taylor in this action, over the age of eighteen 
and am competent to testify in court, including as to the matters set forth in this declaration. This 
declaration is based on my personal knowledge. 
2. At the oral argument held for the appeal in the above-referenced action on August 
17, 2017, Justice Eismann raised the issue of whether Reed Taylor's motion for reconsideration 
was timely since it was not made within 14 days of the entry of the judgment entered in favor of 
Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow. This is the first time this issue has arisen in this case. 
Aug.p.-1 SA.-46 
3. As J have previously testified, Reed Taylor entered into a confidential settlement 
agreement with Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow that resolved Mr. Taylor's claims against 
them. Richard Riley (''Riley'') and Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP ('·Hawley Troxell'') 
were not parties to that Agreement or to the Stipulation later executed between Mr. Taylor, Eberle 
Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow to dismiss Mr. Taylor's claims against them. That Stipulation 
between Mr. Taylor, Eberle Berlin and Turnbow was later filed on September l l, 2015. 
4. After the Stipulation, order for dismissal and partial judgment were submitted to 
this Court for filing and entry, this Court through Ms. Kathy Pataro, confirmed to the parties that 
the Eberle Berlin and Estate of Turnbo\v judgment was not a final judgment in an email sent on 
September 18, 2015. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the email from Kathy 
Pataro dated September 18, 2015, which ,vas sent to all counsel in this case confirming this Comt's 
intent that the Eberle Berlin and Estate of Turnbow judgment was not intended to be a final 
judgment. This email con finned to me what Thad already believed-that the judgment in favor of 
Eberle Berlin and Turnbow was not a final and appealable judgment for the case and that it was 
simply a partial consent judgment. This email was sent at 11 :32 AM, which was before the consent 
partial judgment was later filed in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow at 3:06 PM. 
5. On September 19, 2015, I responded to Ms. Pataro·s email (Exhibit A) and advised 
her that l would see if the parties could agree on the form of a final judgment. Attached as Exhibit 
fl. is a true and correct copy of my email to Ms. Pataro dated September 19, 2015. That email was 
also carbon copied to all counsel for record. 
6. On September 19.2015 (shortly after T sent the email in Exhibit B), I emailed Loren 
Ipsen, Keely Duke and Kevin Griffiths regarding agreeing on a proposed final judgment. It was 
my belief that the final judgment needed to include all relief as to all parties in a single judgment, 
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or, alternatively, because we had settled with Eberle Berlin and Turnbow, that the district court 
could enter Rule 54(b) judgments for Riley and Hawley Troxell as had been indicated in Ms. 
Pataro 's email (Exhibit A). Although I believed that it was appropriate to either enter one final 
judgment that included the claims for relief and all parties as provided under Rule 54(a) (i.e., Riley, 
Hawley Troxell, Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow) or enter separate Rule 54(b) partial final 
judgments in favor of Riley and Hawley Troxell as this Court had indicated it would do, T thought 
that a final judgment that included all of the parties and the previous amounts awarded to Riley 
and Hawley Troxell was the cleaner way, especially since Mr. Taylor would be appealing and 
would need to post security if there was no agreement bet,:veen the parties. Attached as Exhibit C 
is a true and correct copy of my email to Loren Ipsen, Keely Duke and Kevin Griffiths dated 
September 19, 2015. 
7. On September 21, 2015, I received an email from Loren Ipsen confinning that he 
and his clients did not want to agree to submit a final judgment that included all parties and all of 
the claims and requested relief as I had suggested in my email (Exhibit C). Attached as Exhibit D 
is a true and correct copy of Loren Ipsen's email dated September 21, 2015. This email confirmed 
to me that Loren Ipsen and his clients did not believe nor were maintaining that the partial 
judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was a final and appealable 
judgment. 
8. On September 21, 2015 (later the same day that I received Exhibit D), I received 
an email from Loren Ipsen's assistant, Nichole Pappas, with two proposed Rule 54(b) judgments 
for Riley and Hawley Troxell. Attached as Exhibit E are true and correct copies of Ms. Pappas' 
email dated September 21, 2015 (which was sent to all counsel) and the attached proposed Rule 
54(b) ''Final Amended Judgments" for Riley and Hawley Troxell. The attached "Final Amended 
Aug.p.-3 SA.-48 
Judgements., were the same identical judgments that th is Court later signed and entered on October 
9. 2015. In other words, this Court entered the "Final Amended Judgments'' prepared and 
submitted by counsel for Riley and Hawley Troxell. 
9. On September 22, 2015. I emailed Kathy Pataro to inform this Court that the 
proposed ··final Amended Judgments'' in Exhibit E, which were submitted by Hawley Troxell and 
Riley, were not agreed to by me or Mr. Taylor. That said, as I mentioned above, l believed that the 
"Final Amended Judgments" were one of two possible ways to ensure a final judgment was entered 
so that Mr. Taylor could appeal. Attached as Exhibit Fis a true and correct copy of my September 
22, 2015 email to Kathy Pataro, which was carbon copied to all counsel in this lawsuit. 
10. From the time when Ms. Pataro first emailed all of us regarding the entry of a final 
judgment on September 18, 2015 through the date of this Declaration, no one (including counsel 
for Riley and Hawley Troxell) ever complained about the Amended Final Judgments that were 
entered for Hawley Troxell and Riley at the urging of their counsel or alleged that the consent 
judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow on September 18, 2015 was 
a final and appealable judgment. In addition, no one (including counsel for Riley and Hawley 
Troxell) ever complained or alleged that Mr. Taylor's motion for reconsideration and the 
declarations submitted in support of that motion were not timely because they were not submitted 
within 14 days of the entry of the consent judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate 
of Turnbow. The first time anyone has mentioned anything about these issues was when Justice 
Eismann raised the issue at oral argument on August 17, 2017. 
11. Based on the above testimony and the attached Exhibits A-F, I believed that this 
Court, the undersigned counsel, and counsel for Riley and Hawley Troxell were all proceeding 
under the intent and belief that the September 18, 2015 partial judgment entered in favor of Eberle 
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Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was not a final judgment, as was further confirmed by this 
Comt's subsequent entry of the two ·'Final Amended Judgments" in favor of Riley and Hawley 
Troxell. Everyone proceeded under the belief that a final judgment was necessary and the Comt 
ultimately signed the ··Amended Final Judgments" (certified as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b)), which 
were submitted by counsel for Riley and Hawley Troxell. I was never concerned that this Court or 
counsel for Riley and Hawley Troxell would try to maintain that the Eberle Berlin and Estate of 
Turnbow partial judgment would be construed as a final judgment. 
12. After the "Amended Final Judgments" were entered in favor of Riley and Hawley 
Troxell, I continued to proceed in the manner consistent \Vith those judgments being the only final 
and appealable judgments in this lawsuit and. thus, proceeded in preparing, filing and serving Mr. 
Taylor's motion for reconsideration and the declarations submitted in suppo1t of that motion with 
the understanding that they needed to be filed and served within 14 days of the entry of those 
·'Amended Final Judgments'' on October 9, 2015. Had T believed that anyone would be maintaining 
that the partial judgment entered in favor of Eberle Berlin and the Estate of Turnbow was a final 
and appealable judgment, then I would have filed Mr. Taylor's motion for reconsideration and the 
supporting declarations within 14 days of that judgment. I have never missed a deadline for filing 
a motion for reconsider. 
August 21. 2017 at Bellevue, WA 
Date and City and State Signed 
Aug.p.-5 
Roderick C. Bond 
SA.· 50 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 21st day of August, 2017, I caused to be served 
true and correct copies of the foregoing document to the following parties via the method(s) 
indicated below (and to the extent that the below parties have consented, service will also be made 
through the iCourt E-Filing System to the parties at the email addresses indicated belO\v): 
Keely E. Duke 
Kevin A. Griffiths 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL PLLC 
l 087 West River Street, Suite 300 
Boise, lD 83 707 
James D. LaRue 
Jeff A. Thomson 
Loren C. Ipsen 
Elam & Burke, PA 
251 East Front St. 
Boise, ID 83 704 
Aug.p.-6 
Via: 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile - (208) 342-3299 




( ) U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile - (208) 384-5844 











Kathy Pataro <kpataro@adaweb.net> 
Friday, September 18, 2015 11 :32 AM 
lci@elamburke.com 
Keely Duke (ked@dukescanlan.com); Roderick Bond; 'Mike Gaffney' 
CVOC09.18868 Reed Taylor v. Richard Riley 
Good afternoon - I needed to touch base with you on this case. Judge Greenwood did sign the proposed order and 
judgment in regards to this case. But he has a note that you need to submit an amended judgment and Rule 54(b) 
certificate for Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell. Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns. 
Kathy Pataro 
In-Court Clerk for 
TI1e Honorable Richard D. Greenwood 
200 W. Front St., Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 287-7531 







Roderick Bond < rod@roderickbond.com > 
Saturday, September 19, 2015 6:53 AM 
'Kathy Pataro'; 'lci@elamburke.com' 
'Keely Duke (ked@dukescanlan.com)'; 'Mike Gaffney' 
RE: CVOC09.18868 Reed Taylor v. Richard Riley 
Thanks for the email Kathy. I will reach out to Keely and Loren to see if we can all agree on the 
form of a final judgment as to all parties and then get something to the Judge. Thanks. 
Rod 
Roderick Bond 
law Office, PU.C 
Roderick C. Bond 
Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC 
601 108th Ave. NE. Suite 1900 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Tel: (425) 591-6903 
Fax: (425) 321-0343 
Email: rod@roderickbond.com 
Website: www.roderickbond.com 
From: Kathy Pataro [mailto:kpataro@adaweb.net] 
Sent: Friday, September 18, 2015 11:32 AM 
To: lci@elamburke.com 
Cc: Keely Duke (ked@dukescanlan.com) <ked@dukescanlan.com>; Roderick Bond <rod@roderickbond.com>; 'Mike 
Gaffney' <gaffney@beardstclair.com> 
Subject: CVOC09.18868 Reed Taylor v. Richard Riley 
Good afternoon - I needed to touch base with you on this case. Judge Greenwood did sign the proposed order and 
judgment in regards to this case. But he has a note that you need to submit an amended judgment and Rule 54(b) 
certificate for Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell. Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns. 
Kathy Pataro 
In-Court Clerk for 
The Honorable Richard D. Greenwood 
200 W. Front St., Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 287-7531 
1 






Loren and Keely: 
Roderick Bond <rod@roderickbond.com> 
Saturday, September 19, 2015 6:56 AM 
'lci@elamburke.com'; 'Keely Duke (ked@dukescanlan.com)'; 'Kevin Griffiths' 
'Mike Gaffney'; 'javondet@beardstclair.com' 
In light of Kathy's email, I propose that we send a joint final judgment for the judge's 
signature. I think that the judgment would simply combine what is the judgment that was 
recently submitted by Keely with the contents of the judgment previously entered for HTEH 
and Mr. Riley. It seems to me that would be the form necessary. What do you both think? 
Rod 
Boderick Bond 
Law Office, PU.C 
Roderick C. Bond 
Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC 
601 103th Ave. NE, Suite 1900 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Tel: (425) 591-6903 
Fax: (425) 321-0343 
Email: rod@roderickbond.com 
Website: www.roderickbond.com 








Loren Ipsen <lci@elamburke.com> 
Monday, September 21, 2015 10:50 AM 
Roderick Bond; 'Keely Duke'; 'Kevin Griffiths' 
'Mike Gaffney'; javondet@beardstclair.com 
RE: Hawley Troxell 
Thanks for your offer, but it appears from Kathy Pataro's email that the Court has already signed the proposed order and 
judgment, which I assume relate to the Turnbow estate and Eberle Berlin. Therefore, I think it would be simpler for us 
just to submit final judgments for Hawley Troxell and Mr. Riley as suggested by the Court. 
Regards, 
Loren Ipsen 
From: Roderick Bond [mailto:rod@roderickbond.com] 
Sent: Saturday, September 19, 2015 7:56 AM 
To: Loren Ipsen <lci@elamburke.com>; 'Keely Duke' <ked@dukescanlan.com>; 'Kevin Griffiths' 
<KAG@dukescanlan.com> 
Cc: 'Mike Gaffney' <gaffney@beardstclair.com>; javondet@beardstclair.com 
Subject: 
Loren and Keely: 
In light of Kathy's email, I propose that we send a joint final judgment for the judge's 
signature. I think that the judgment would simply combine what is the judgment that was 
recently submitted by Keely with the contents of the judgment previously entered for HTEH 
and Mr. Riley. It seems to me that would be the form necessary. What do you both think? 
Rod 
Roderick Bond 
~w Office, PllC 
Roderick C. Bond 
Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC 
601 1081h Ave. NE, Suite 1900 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Tel: (425) 591-6903 
Fax: (425) 321-0343 
Email: rod@roderickbond.com 
Website: www.roderickbond.com 
Thi., email and ;Jny att,Jchrnenb m,;y be attorni::y<i1ent pnv:leg,d, protected as Gttorn12y work prodL1ct .. and/or subject to ,Jny other ;,pplirnbie 
p(;ii!ege.,. Th,, unauthori,ed viewing or- di::.s<"cmmat.ion of any ernail or att.ai.:hrnent is prohibit.f:'d. If you have l"<·ceived this ern;iil in error or it was, 
riot intended to be delivered to you, please irnnwdiately de\:'te this ern,iii ;,nd all dttachrnents and contact the sender at tr1e Jdcfress indicated 





Nichole Pappas <nlp@elamburke.com> 
Monday, September 21, 2015 2:19 PM 
To: Roderick Bond; gaffney@beardstclair.com; javondet@beardstclair.com; ked@dukescanlan.com; 
kag@dukescanlan.com 
Cc: Kayde Baird 
Subject: Taylor v. Riley, et al. 
Attachments: doc06932020150921151443.pdf; doc06932220150921151510.pdf 
Counsel: 
Attached please find copies of the following: 
1. Final Amended Judgment (Richard A. Riley); and 
2. Final Amended Judgment (Hawley Troxell). 
These documents will be delivered to Judge Greenwood this afternoon. 
Thanks. 
Nichole Pappas 
Legal Assistant to Loren C. Ipsen 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, JD 83701 
(208) 343-5454 
(208) 384-5844 (fax) 
email website 
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt from disclosure 
under applicable law. If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately by replying to this 
message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you. 
1 
Aug.p.-11 SA. - 56 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
Case No. CV-OC-0918868 
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, 
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
The Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is 
dismissed in its entirety with prejudice. 
Judgment is entered in favor of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP against Reed J. 
Taylor for costs and attorney fees in the amount of $25,029.00. 
DATEDthis __ dayof _______ ,2015. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - l 
Aug.p.-12 SA.-57 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above Final Amended Judgment or order it 
is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined 
that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and 
does hereby direct that the above Final Amended Judgment or order shall be a final judgment 
upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
DATED this __ day of _______ , 2015. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2 
Aug.p.-13 SA. - 58 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ day of , 2015, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in 
the manner indicated below: 
Roderick C. Bond U.S. Mail --
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC -- Hand Delivery 
601 108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900 -- Federal Express 
Bellevue, WA 98004 -- Facsimile Transmission 
E-mail --
Michael D. Gaffney -- U.S. Mail 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA Hand Delivery --
2105 Coronado Street -- Federal Express 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 -- Facsimile Transmission 
E-mail --
Keeley E. Duke -- U.S. Mail 
Kevin A. Griffiths -- Hand Delivery 
DUKE, SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC -- Federal Express 
P. 0. Box 7387 Facsimile Transmission --
Boise, ID 83707 -- E-mail 
James D. LaRue U.S. Mail --
Loren C. Ipsen -- Hand Delivery 
Jeffrey A. Thomson -- Federal Express 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. -- Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Box 1539 E-mail --
Boise, ID 83701 
Deputy Clerk 
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 3 
Aug.p.-14 SA.-59 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RICHARD A. RILEY, an individual; 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY 
LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership; 
SHARON CUMMINGS, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert M. 
Turnbow; and EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, 
TURNBOW & McKLVEEN, CHARTERED, 
an Idaho corporation; 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
Case No. CV-OC-0918868 
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT 
The Plaintiffs Complaint against Defendant Richard A. Riley is dismissed in its entirety 
with prejudice. 
Judgment is entered in favor of Richard A. Riley against Reed J. Taylor for costs and 
attorney fees in the amount of $239,265.25. 
DATEDthis __ dayof _______ ,2015. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - I 
Aug.p.-15 SA.-60 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above Final Amended Judgment or order it 
is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined 
that there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and 
does hereby direct that the above Final Amended Judgment or order shall be a final judgment 
upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
DATEDthis __ dayof _______ ,2015. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 2 
Aug.p.-16 SA. - 61 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ day of , 2015, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in 
the manner indicated below: 
Roderick C. Bond U.S. Mail --
RODERICK BOND LAW OFFICE, PLLC -- Hand Delivery 
601 108th Ave., NE, Suite 1900 -- Federal Express 
Bellevue, WA 98004 -- Facsimile Transmission 
E-mail --
Michael D. Gaffney -- U.S. Mail 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA Hand Delivery --
2105 Coronado Street -- Federal Express 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 -- Facsimile Transmission 
E-mail --
Keeley E. Duke -- U.S. Mail 
Kevin A. Griffiths -- Hand Delivery 
DUKE, SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC -- Federal Express 
P. 0. Box 7387 Facsimile Transmission --
Boise, ID 83 707 E-mail --
James D. LaRue U.S. Mail --
Loren C. Ipsen -- Hand Delivery 
Jeffrey A. Thomson -- Federal Express 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. -- Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Box 1539 E-mail --
Boise, ID 83701 
Deputy Clerk 
FINAL AMENDED JUDGMENT - 3 








Roderick Bond <rod@roderickbond.com> 
Tuesday, September 22, 2015 4:33 PM 
'Kathy Pataro'; 'lci@elamburke.com' 
'Keely Duke (ked@dukescanlan.com)'; 'Mike Gaffney'; 'John Avondet' 
RE: CVOC09.18868 Reed Taylor v. Richard Riley 
I understand that Loren Ipsen submitted two judgments. I just wanted you and Judge 
Greenwood to know that Mr. Taylor's counsel did not approve those judgments. As a follow 
up to my previous email to you, the parties did not work together to approve the judgments. 
Rod 
Roderick C. Bond 
Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC 
601 1081h Ave. NE, Suite 1900 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Tel: (425) 591-6903 
Fax: (425) 321-0343 
Email: rod@roderickbond.com 
Website: www.roderickbond.com 
any 2ttachrnents. rnd\ be att<Ynev-c::er,t p<viL2ged; protectc: 
The ut dnv ~>'r?ii'. 
From: Kathy Pataro [mailto:kpataro@adaweb.net] 
Sent: Friday, September 18, 2015 11:32 AM 
To: lci@elamburke.com 
Cc: Keely Duke (ked@dukescanlan.com) <ked@dukescanlan.com>; Roderick Bond <rod@roderickbond.com>; 'Mike 
Gaffney' <gaffney@beardstclair.com> 
Subject: CVOC09.18868 Reed Taylor v. Richard Riley 
Good afternoon - I needed to touch base with you on this case. Judge Greenwood did sign the proposed order and 
judgment in regards to this case. But he has a note that you need to submit an amended judgment and Rule 54{b) 
certificate for Mr. Riley and Hawley Troxell. Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns. 
Kathy Pataro 
In-Court Clerk for 
TI1e Honorable Richard D. Greenwood 
.ZOO W. Front St., Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 287-7531 
Aug.p.-18 SA.-63 
